

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

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Kosovo

Operation
ALLIED FORCE

FROM THE EDITOR

Military Intelligence, as with the military in general, is undergoing great change. We are fortunate in this issue of the **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin** to identify lessons learned from our recent operations in Kosovo with Operation ALLIED FORCE.

Although there has been great debate whether we can, or should, attempt to win conflicts strictly through air power, warriors have historically sought to gain the greatest possible standoff. From the English longbow, through the mortar, to the supersonic jet, the development of warfare is the story of increasing the distance from the enemy. General Norman Schwarzkopf's "left hook" of 1991 may be forever replaced by the "long left jab"—pummeling the enemy into submission.

Complex systems such as battlefield conditions are rich in information—information that must be acquired immediately. The commander's wisdom must be founded by direct access to persons who serve him as the eyes on specific conditions, and who enable him to anticipate the outcome. To be reliable, information must be first-hand. There is thus an important relationship between intelligence and timing.

—Sun Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*, translated by Roger Ames

We learned two important lessons from Kosovo. First, we learned that, despite the fact that it was primarily an air campaign, the Army is vital. The Army is integral in creating distance from the enemy. Our Apache helicopters, multiple launch rockets, and long-range artillery were poised to enter the fight. Our intelligence systems and sensors (including the Field Artillery's fire-detection radars) were critical to our success.

Secondly, we learned that intelligence must become immediate. The time has come to stop speaking of "timely" or "near real time" intelligence and start speaking of "immediate" intelligence. In a conflict such as Kosovo, where we were targeting small convoys, the shooter (whether a pilot, naval missile officer, or an Army artillery or infantry soldier) must have concrete, immediate intelligence. The more layers through which our intelligence passes, the less valuable it becomes.

We have done well in Kosovo, but we can do better. How many bombs missed their targets? How much jet fuel did we waste? Could we have defeated the Serbs even faster with more precise, immediate intelligence?

The MI professionals of Task Force (TF) Hawk have graciously shared these lessons with us. General Jay Hendrix, former V Corps and TF Hawk Commander, introduces the TF's efforts. Major Stephen Iwicki gives us two articles delineating how to establish an intelligence task force and operate an ACE in combat. Warrant Officer One Hector Cuevas provides insight on intelligence support to the targeting effort, and Captains Scott Shoemaker and Donald Moore examine the heart of TF Hawk's mission: targeting.

As always, we have included several articles of general interest to our readers. On page 10, we have included a short piece written by Lieutenant Colonel Gus Greene introducing the Army's transformation to a medium-weight force. Look for more in-depth articles in an upcoming issue. Major Jeff Morris and Ms. Regan Smith explain the national-level counterintelligence community and automated human intelligence support; Captain Kent Webber discusses theater-level HUMINT. LTC Michael Flynn provides some suggestions for S2s at the Joint Readiness Training Center. We also have an interesting "Quick Tip" by Sergeant First Class Randy Staggs on how to use inexpensive architectural software to design your tactical operations center or any element in three dimensions.

Please use **MIPB** as a place to exchange fresh ideas for our Corps. We are seeking insightful, innovative, and even controversial articles relating to the following topics—

- Intelligence Analysis: at strategic, theater, operational, and tactical levels; unconventional warfare scenarios; technical analysis; etc.
- Tactical Intelligence: lessons learned, new ways to do things, etc.
- Implementing information operations.



Writers of the Quarter

Captains Donald Moore and Scott Shoemaker are our Writers of the Quarter for January-March 2000, for their article, "Task Force Hawk Targeting Intelligence Process." Thanks to all of our authors for their great articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor. Contributions like yours make **MIPB** the professional development forum for MI professionals.

How to Submit an Article

MIPB is always seeking good articles on a variety of topics as well as action photographs of MI soldiers. Please see page 60 for some suggested topics and instructions on how to submit your articles, pictures, and book reviews.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE



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VANTAGE POINT

by Major General John D. Thomas, Jr.

This issue of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* contains some great articles on military intelligence activities during Kosovo operations. These articles are pointers to the future nature of the MI Corps. It must be relevant, agile, and responsive in providing intelligence to enable the commander's decision-making. It should integrate all possible intelligence capabilities and focus them on a combat commander's requirements. The outstanding intelligence soldiers of our V Corps have given us a glimpse into the future.

Our mission is to transform the entire MI Corps into a force enabled to respond to varied contingencies on short notice and capable of beginning operations immediately. To do this, we need to make several changes to our force:

- We must lighten our organizations. Equipment that a C-130-class aircraft cannot transport will not be relevant to the fight.
- We should continue to refine our reach-back and split-based capabilities. Intelligence organizations have set the standard for these virtual staffs; we cannot rest on our accomplishments.
- Our tactical units must be more balanced, demanding more tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) and imagery capabilities.
- We must pool our linguists to increase flexibility and target-area knowledge.
- We must use the power of the entire MI Corps, continuing to leverage INSCOM (U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command) capabilities in support of corps, division, and even brigade operations.
- Our analysts must be more capable of interpreting asymmetric threats.

The professionals of the MI Corps are the most important aspect of this transformation. The challenge is to use the capabilities of the entire MI Corps: the U.S. Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, the Active Component Army, Army civilians, and defense contractors all play an important part in achieving this vision. Our challenge is to determine how best to integrate their capabilities, capitalizing on their strengths and mitigating their limitations. We must become the Military Intelligence Team, not a grouping of components. I see great progress in this integration.



Major General John D. Thomas, Jr.

Operations in Kosovo tell us that our transformation efforts are on target and we are working many venues to achieve this vision. The MI structure in the Initial Brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington, the recent MI Functional Area Assessment and Functional Review, the Corps redesign initiative, and training and doctrine efforts within the Intelligence Center all support the transformation. Fielding of systems like the All-Source Analysis System, Common Ground Station, Prophet, the Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, the Tactical Exploitation System (TES), and Guardrail Common Sensor improve the relevance and flexibility of our force.

As we begin the 21st century, MI has a bright future, relevant and in demand as we move toward Force XXI. We need to pull together to make this vision a reality. Thanks for all you do for the MI Corps, the Army, and our nation.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

CSM FORUM

by Command Sergeant Major Scott C. Chunn

Welcome to the 21st century, Military Intelligence! This past year was tremendous; we have stopped downsizing and are continuing to move forward. Our promotions for senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) this year were the best we have seen in a long time. We now need to focus on the junior ranks—particularly the junior NCOs. We still have too many shortage military occupational specialties (listed as "Star MOSs" requiring fewer points for promotion). Look in your units for soldiers who are eligible for promotion to Sergeant and Staff Sergeant; some may not be ready, but many are. I am confident that we could promote a number of Specialists and Sergeants to ease the shortages in those grades without lessening standards or weakening the NCO Corps. In addition, as the Army implements the last round of promotions from the centralized lists, we will only exacerbate these shortages. We need to abandon the "downsizing" mindset and shift to one that challenges and mentors our young soldiers to take on more responsibility and to become or progress as NCOs.

The Command Sergeant Major and Sergeant Major Worldwide Conference will be 6 through 10 March 2000. If you have issues or agenda items that you would like to see considered or briefed, please send them to me at chunns@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and we will try to accommodate them with our panel discussion groups. We look forward to showing you some of the latest training innovations here at the Intelligence Center, the NCO Academy, and in our "plug and play" classrooms. If this will be your last Army-wide conference, please notify me by E-mail so we can begin compiling the list to recognize you at the conference and to



Command Sergeant Major Scott C. Chunn

ensure you have an opportunity to share your parting thoughts with us.

The MI Classroom at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy still needs memorabilia. If you have any ideas, display items, or photographs you would like to donate, please contact me at the above E-mail address.

As always, train hard, take care of soldiers and their families, and have fun. Thanks!

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

Address Verification

Due to new postal regulations, we are updating our mailing list for **MIPB**. The Post Office now requires building numbers, street addresses, and nine-digit zip codes. APO addresses should include the unit, box number, and CMR number as appropriate. Other overseas or non-U.S. addresses should be complete, including postal and country codes and names. Please review and update your mailing label. If your address is not correct or is incomplete, please notify us by E-mail at martinezc@huachuca-emh1.army.mil with subject heading "Address Update." Please include both your incorrect (copy it exactly from the label) and correct addresses. You can also contact us by telephone at commercial (520) 538-1015 or DSN 879-1015, and by mail (see page 1 or page 64 for the address).

Task Force Hawk

An Overwhelming Intelligence Success



U. S. Army photo.

by General Jay Hendrix

I strongly believe *"the spirit of the warrior is a combat multiplier."* All of our Task Force Hawk soldiers, particularly our intelligence soldiers, maintained a focused and determined warrior attitude that not only kept us ready for action, but made us a major contributor to the success of Operation ALLIED FORCE. The intelligence and operational challenges we faced forced us to go beyond proven doctrinal approaches and consistently break new ground in our command and control procedures, analytical thought processes, and the integration of new systems and capabilities.

The Corps had just completed a Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Warfighter exercise prior to deployment. The BCTP observer/controllers (O/Cs) praised the intelligence support and overall mission execution of our Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC). I felt confident we had a trained team and were ready to go.

The Task Force Hawk mission was non-doctrinal; however, it is indicative of the new and challenging missions we confront in today's world. Our challenge was to task-organize a team, particularly for intelligence, which could accomplish the mission. The Corps' intelligence leadership rose to the occasion and deployed an MI force that met all our mission requirements.

Throughout the deployment, the scope of the intelligence mission expanded in concert with the growing requirements placed on Task Force Hawk. Despite the increased workload, I watched our soldiers continue to develop an accurate and timely picture of the Serbian forces in Kosovo. They quickly gained the deserved reputation as the tactical ground intelligence center for western and central Kosovo.

We enjoyed many intelligence successes during this operation and I attribute that success to the outstanding manner in which our intelligence soldiers applied their systems and analytical approaches to meet our mission requirements. Every intelligence soldier was a major contributor to our mission success. Our junior enlisted soldiers shone, particularly in the areas of Joint STARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System), UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle), and national imagery exploitation. Our noncommissioned officers provided leadership both in the analytical arena and in taking care of their soldiers in a hostile environment. Our officers orchestrated the analytical effort and clearly communicated a timely,



accurate picture of the battlefield to senior leaders throughout Operation ALLIED FORCE.

I am extremely proud of all our intelligence soldiers. When the call came to deploy, we were prepared, and we successfully executed our mission. The investments that we have made in new systems and in training paid big dividends. Stand tall and be proud. Army intelligence clearly is *"Always Out Front."* *

General John W. "Jay" Hendrix received his commission from the Georgia Institute of Technology and entered active duty in November 1965. He commanded V Corps in Heidelberg, Germany, from July 1997 through November 1999 and commanded Task Force Hawk during Operation ALLIED FORCE as well. General Hendrix is currently serving as Commander, U. S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) at Fort McPherson, Georgia. He has also been Commander, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Stewart; Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School; Commander, U.S. Army Infantry Center; and Commander, 2d Brigade, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized). General Hendrix had two combat assignments as a Rifle Company Commander in the Republic of Vietnam and served as Assistant Division Commander, 1st Armored Division, in Operation DESERT STORM. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree from the Georgia Institute of Technology and a Master of Arts degree in History from Middle Tennessee State University.

Generating the Task Force for Combat Intelligence Operations

by Major Stephen K. Iwicki

In today's environment of constantly changing contingency missions, one common theme has emerged. The deploying force must task organize both internal and external assets to meet the particular mission at hand. Our intelligence units' Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs) simply do not reflect the systems and personnel needed to conduct many of our emerging assigned missions. Consequently, we use our MTOE as a baseline structure that we tactically tailor to each mission. While this is one of the doctrinal tenets of our MI Branch, it is becoming harder to execute, particularly in a joint or combined environment. This article will discuss of the trials and tribulations at V Corps during mission analysis for our deployment of Task Force Hawk to support Operation ALLIED FORCE.

Step One— Define the Mission

The first step in our force generation process was to determine our specified and implied intelligence tasks for this deployment. The corps ACE has two primary missions: intelligence support to corps deep operations, and situational development of the battlefield out to 96 hours in the future. The tight focus on Task Force (TF) Hawk deep operations significantly reduced the scope of the ACE mission. Our primary mission was to provide timely and accurate targeting intelligence to the Deep Operations Coordination Center (DOCC) in support of

AH-64 Apache helicopter deep attacks and Multiple Launcher Rocket Systems (MLRS) deep fires operations.

Step Two—Define the Requirements

The second step was to determine the necessary systems, architecture, and personnel required to accomplish our mission (see Figure 1). Next, we had to resolve where TF Hawk fell in the overall command and control (C²) structure of Operation ALLIED FORCE: we were to be a U.S.-only element under the C² of Joint Task Force Noble Anvil. Despite being a U.S.-only element, the nature of our planned deep attack and deep fires operations would require us to work closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). These two facts forced us

to develop an architecture that worked in three environments: U.S. Army only, U.S. joint operations, and NATO combined operations.

System Requirements. The targeting nature of our mission drove our system requirements; critical system requirements drove our architecture development process. Clearly, five things were crucial to our mission success:

- Immediate access to electronic intelligence (ELINT) on active Serbian radar emitters.
- Access to Joint STARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) moving target indicators (MTI) data.
- Immediate access to theater and national imagery products and reports.
- An extensive terrain analysis and visualization capability.




Figure 1. Requirements the G2/ACE Must Consider.



Photos courtesy of SFC Gregory Thompson.

- Operational control of a tactical unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicle (UAV).

Electronic Processing and Dissemination System (AEPDS) in the deployment package easily provided access to ELINT reporting. The system belonged to our sister company (B Company, 302d MI Battalion), and it habitually deployed and co-located with the ACE. Our organic Medium Ground Station Module (MGSM) would provide us the necessary Joint STARS MTI data.

Immediate access to theater and national imagery products represented a greater challenge. We overcame this challenge through a combination of architectural links and a new system called Data-master (see Warrant Officer One Cuevas' article on page 16). We deployed the battalion's organic Enhanced Tactical Radar Correlator (ETRAC) to Italy so it could co-locate with the Air Force's U-2 downlink. We deployed a TROJAN SPIRIT II (TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal II or TS II) with the ETRAC, thus providing the necessary connectivity to support our terrain analysis and visualization capability that proved absolutely critical to our success.

Finally, we had validated the need for corps control of a UAV system

to support deep operations during our recent Corps Battle Command Training Program Warfighter exercise. The employment and operational control of the Hunter UAV became one of our Commanding General's top priorities.

ACE Architecture. The ACE architecture required little change from our standing plan other than increasing bandwidth. We built our architecture around our organic TS II to provide connectivity on our collateral and sensitive compartmented information (SCI) networks. The decision to deploy TF Hawk to Albania and the demands of some of the systems listed above required some new additions to our communications plan.

First and most importantly, we had to solve how we would receive the UAV video feed from Task Force Hunter. Originally, we planned to co-locate with TF Hunter and place a UAV Ground Control Station (GCS) with the ACE. The eventual geographic separation between our UAV element and the ACE forced us to use the Joint Broadcast System (JBS) as our UAV video connectivity. JBS¹ also provided a significant boost to our architecture capabilities by allowing us to receive up to three channels of Hunter and Predator UAV video, national imagery, and two Cable News Network channels.

Secondly, the combination of the collection routes of the U.S. Air Force E-8 Joint STARS aircraft and the mountainous terrain of Albania would influence our ability to receive continuous Joint STARS MTI data. Requesting and receiving a Joint STARS Remote Workstation (JSWS) overcame this potential difficulty. The JSWS system includes the equivalent of a Common Ground Station (CGS) remote workstation and its own satellite communications (SATCOM) link. The SATCOM link allows the JSWS to receive Joint STARS data regardless of the line-of-sight (LOS) restrictions the terrain places on the MGSM or CGS.

Third, we had to solve the issue of bandwidth and a redundant capability should our one remaining TS II fail. Additionally, the need for an SCI video teleconference (VTC) capability joined our list of requirements. The 66th MI Group's provision of a JWICS (Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System) Mobile Integrated Communications System (JMICS) suite and operators enabled us to meet this requirement. However, the bandwidth on one TS II would not adequately support both the VTC requirement and our heavy data transmission requirements. The 1st Armor Division provided an additional TS II, which gave us communications redundancy, should one of the systems become non-operational. It also gave us two distinct TROJAN circuits with which to meet our requirements. We dedicated the smaller bandwidth circuit to the VTC node and the larger circuit to meeting ACE data transmission requirements.

Finally, we had to solve our NATO connectivity problem. We did not have any operational systems capable of interfacing with NATO systems so we coordinated with the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) to receive a Linked Op-

erational Intelligence Center, Europe (LOCE) system. Upon deployment, however, we found that the LOCE did not meet all our NATO connectivity requirements and arranged to receive one Crisis Response Operations in NATO Operating Systems (CRONOS) machine. This gave us the necessary connectivity with coalition intelligence organizations in NATO.

Personnel Battle Roster. Personnel resources requirements, liaison team requirements, and the need to maintain an intelligence capability in the garrison to support the remainder of the Corps units all affected the development of the ACE battle roster. These requirements determined personnel availability for the deployment.

Early in the planning process, the Corps G2 identified the need to send liaison teams to several crucial nodes in our operations. While painful, it was essential that we send some of our best people to perform this function. First, we identified the need to have two liaison officers (LNOs) at the Joint Analysis Center at Molesworth, United Kingdom. The Corps Deputy G2 and an ACE warrant officer deployed to this location to ensure the JAC clearly understood Task Force Hawk requirements and to foster analyst-to-analyst discussion. The JAC LNOs also stayed apprised of JAC products and rapidly forwarded them to the TF as required.

The TF Commander directed the deployment of an LNO team to the

CAOC to support integration of our air and fire support operations. This team consisted of G2, G3, and Fire Support Element (FSE) representatives whose mission was to facilitate the processing of TF Hawk targets and assist with air tasking order (ATO) deconfliction as required. The ACE deployed one major and one captain as the G2 portion of this LNO team.

Additionally, we identified the need to receive an LNO team from Task Force Hunter (our UAV element). While we had experience with UAV operations in a simulation environment, the Corps had never employed an actual UAV system.

tasks, systems personnel requirements, and augmentation needs, we next began work on our troop-to-task analysis. This effort included not only ACE-specific functions but also others such as liaison teams and dedicated intelligence planners to support the DOCC. A combination of ACE and Corps G2 personnel filled these positions; the ACE provided one major, two captains, and one warrant officer to fill some of these requirements. This was a painful loss of analytical power in the ACE.

The troop-to-task analysis provided the basis of the ACE's battle roster. We designed our

battle roster providing for continuous operations and the operational skills each personnel slot would require. Once we developed this roster, we assigned individuals to each position. We identified all short falls and documented them as augmenta-

TF HAWK BATTLE ROSTER									
SOLDIER	TEAM	POSITION	SHIFT	TOOL	RESPONSIBILITIES	STATUS	REMARKS		
ACE CMD/CONTROL									
ACE		ACE Chief	DAY		Supervise the ACE	PTD	BLB		
MAJ		DEPUTY ACE Chief	NIGHT		Supervise the ACE	PTD	BLB		
ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE SECTION									
DAY SHIFT									
LPT	ASI	DIR	DAY	JDSS, RWS, PC	TEAM LDR	PTD	OUT BRIEF, INTSUM		
G.W	ASI	AS TTH	DAY	JDSS, RWS, PC, WC	DEEP TARGET PLANNING	PTD	TGT DB		
G.W	ASI	COMINT TTH	DAY	JDSS, PC	JOINT ANALYST	PTD	JOINT/INTSUM		
QPT	ASI	NOI DIR	DAY	JDSS, RWS, PC	BATTLE TRACKING NOI	PTD	SET DEV, INTSUM, BDA		
PEL	ASI	ANALYST	DAY	JDSS, PC	JOINT ANALYST	PTD	SET DEV, INTSUM		
SPV	ASI	ANALYST	DAY	JDSS, RWS, PC	TARGET TRACKING/NOMINATION	PTD	TGT DB		
PEL	ASI	ANALYST	DAY	JDSS, RWS, PC	ANALYST	PTD	SET DEV		
PEL	ASI	ANALYST	DAY	JDSS, RWS, PC	ANALYST	PTD	TGT		
NIGHT SHIFT									
LPT	ASI	DIR	NIGHT	JDSS, RWS, PC	SHIFT LDR	PTD	OUT BRIEF, INTSUM		
WCH	ASI	AS TTH	NIGHT	JDSS, RWS, PC, WC	DEEP TARGET PLANNING	PTD	TGT DB		
G.W	ASI	JOINT TTH	NIGHT	JDSS, PC	JOINT ANALYST	PTD	JOINT/INTSUM		
QPT	ASI	NOI DIR	NIGHT	JDSS, RWS, PC	BATTLE TRACKING NOI	PTD	SET DEV, INTSUM, BDA		
SPV	ASI	ANALYST	NIGHT	JDSS, RWS, PC	COMINT ANALYST	PTD	SET DEV, INTSUM		
QPT	ASI	ANALYST	NIGHT	JDSS, RWS, PC	TARGET TRACKING/NOMINATION	PTD	TGT DB		
MEI	ASI	ANALYST	NIGHT	JDSS, FAST, PC	ELINT ANALYST	PTD	SET DEV		
PEL	ASI	ANALYST	NIGHT	JDSS, RWS, PC	ANALYST	PTD	TGT		
ELINT ANALYSIS (FAST OPERATORS)									
WCH	ASI	ANALYST	DAY	FAST JDSS, RWS, PC	FAST OPERATOR: ELINT ANALYST	PTD	TGT, ELINT		
QPT	ASI	ANALYST	NIGHT	FAST JDSS, RWS, PC	FAST OPERATOR: ELINT ANALYST	B/NOI ME	TGT, ELINT		

Figure 2. TF Hawk Battle Roster.

The 15th MI Battalion (AE) deployed a captain and a master sergeant as an LNO team from Task Force Hunter. These individuals worked with the Collection Manager to plan UAV missions, assist in exploitation, and coordinate in-flight dynamic retasking of the UAV.

The final addition to our organization was a National Intelligence Support Team. The NIST consisted of representatives from the national intelligence community and included the geospatial terrain team from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA).

Having documented our required

tion requirements.

Step Three— Meet Force Constraints

The initial planning guidance placed no constraints on personnel for the intelligence function. We therefore developed a battle roster that deployed the majority of the Corps ACE and left only a small element in the rear to augment the Corps Military Intelligence Support Element (CMISE) and meet the sanctuary support needs.

As the overall TF Hawk force list matured, greater requirements for force protection in a bare-base en-

environment emerged and forced cut-backs in other areas. We then developed an alternative battle roster that included only the minimal essential personal and systems necessary to meet mission requirements. This option forced us to rely heavily on sanctuary operations.

The Commanding General felt the inherent risks of the second roster

current intelligence loop due to the deployment process.

We ascertained the need to have several personnel deploy with the first group ("Torch Party") of personnel to arrive in Albania even before arrival of the advance parties. These three ACE soldiers coordinated land space, ensured all communications line-of-sight (LOS) requirements would be met, and

main command post area.

- It gave these individuals the chance to familiarize themselves with the developing infrastructure and know where to coordinate when necessity dictated.
- It allowed the construction of the LSA to begin ahead of the arrival of the main body. By the time the main body began to arrive, we had erected enough sleep tents to give the soldiers a dry place to sleep and store their gear in the extremely wet and muddy environment.



were too high and directed us to develop a package that had less reliance on sanctuary support, but was not as large as the original one. This resulted in our final battle roster that included 60 personnel and 12 vehicles (see Figure 2).

Step Four—Design the Force Flow

Our next challenge was to sequence the deployment of personnel and equipment in line with the establishment of a life support area (LSA), communications connectivity, and reestablishment of the ACE as an operational entity in Albania. We attempted to maintain our intelligence knowledge base by keeping a small analytical cell at the end of the flow. This minimized the time ACE analysts were out of the

coordinated the arrival of follow-on personnel.

Next, we identified the requirement to deploy a three-person advanced party 48 hours after the initial three. The personnel from the advanced party and the initial three began construction of the LSA and coordinated the reception of the main body. The main body began arriving 36 hours behind the advance party. Having these six people in place preceding the arrival of the main body proved invaluable for several reasons:

- It ensured a dedicated piece of terrain for the ACE.
- Clearly marking off the terrain with engineer tape prevented vehicles from driving over it and quickly turning it to mud. That happened to the majority of the

By the time our equipment arrived with the main body, we had established the ACE anchor point on the ground and had positioned marking stakes for each ACE vehicle. Additionally, we had developed an order of march to bring the ACE vehicles into the main compound. This was critical since there was only one entrance point and the muddy road was quickly deteriorating.

The airflow of our vehicles was sequential with one aircraft arriving almost every hour. This allowed us to front load the TS IIs and have all ACE vehicles on the ground in less than a twelve-hour period.

Step Five—Reacting to Changes

Nothing ever goes as planned, and this deployment was no exception. Throughout the deployment, we encountered new missions and requirements. Our first new requirement was maintaining operations in a miserable set of conditions. We had planned for bad weather and poor conditions, but the unending rain and extensive mud brought some important challenges.

Our first priority was to take care of our soldiers. First-line leaders ensured they had appropriate clothing for the conditions and stayed as dry as possible. They succeeded



and we had almost no health problems.

Second, the systems control (SYSCON) soldiers took care of our automated systems. While conditions outside were wet and muddy, conditions inside our expando vans were just the opposite. The air conditioning in the vans quickly dried any mud tracked inside and turned it into a fine dust which worked its way into everything inside the vans. The SYSCON soldiers implemented an extensive daily automation cleaning and maintenance program that kept our systems up and running at all times.

Finally, we faced the "mission creep" challenge. The ACE leadership was never comfortable with the targeting focus taking precedence over the situational development mission. The deployment cap forced us to leave the situation development team in the rear; we expected this would haunt us later and it did. As the mission of TF Hawk evolved, we began production of a daily intelligence summary (INTSUM).

The situation development team normally produces our INTSUMs. While we did deploy more than just the targeting team in the implemented force package, we did not

have the depth of personnel we needed to do detailed situational development. The Task Force Commander alleviated the strain by prioritizing requirements in our daily briefings. He visited the ACE often; his visits and discussions with the ACE soldiers communicated the importance of our work and motivated every soldier to get the expanding job done.

Conclusions

Tactical tailoring is one of our basic Intelligence Branch tenets, but it is often extremely difficult for an organization to implement. We supposedly train as we fight, but never actually fight with the same organization for combat or systems as we had in training. We owe it to ourselves to do better.

Our current manpower documents need modification to reflect more accurately the requirements we face on the modern battlefield. The MTOE (modified table of organization and equipment) for the G2 and ACE does not provide for—

- LNOs.
- Battle damage assessment (BDA) team.
- Computer-smart network man-

agers to run our computer networks.

In effect, it does not account for the proven mission requirements we have repeatedly validated in places like Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Albania.

No perfect organizational structure exists that will meet every mission requirement, but we could do better by focusing more on joint and combined operations. The days of Army-only operations are virtually gone. We need to ensure that we have the systems and training necessary to fight and win on joint and coalition teams. Clearly, the effect on an organization is different as we move higher from brigade level to corps level. Today, however, even a brigade headquarters may need to form an Army Forces (ARFOR) headquarters requiring joint and possibly Coalition connectivity. In that case, the burden would fall on the divisional Analysis and Control Teams (ACT), which habitually support the brigade headquarters.

Task force generation is always unique to the mission at hand. While similarities will exist, you must do a detailed mission analysis, including a troop-to-task listing. No matter how hard you try, you will never have a 100-percent solution. Be prepared for the unexpected by hedging your bets whenever and wherever possible. It will usually make coping with Murphy's law a little easier.*

Endnote

1. See the article by Staff Sergeant Marvin Schwerzler in the October-December 1999 *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* for more discussion of our JBS employment.

Major Steve Iwicki is currently serving as the V Corps ACE Chief. During the TF Hawk deployment, he was the Deputy ACE Chief. He has served in intelligence and staff positions at all echelons of the Army except division staff. Among the significant positions he

has held are Chief of Current Intelligence, U.S. Army Central Command during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM; XVIIIth Airborne Corps G2 Planner for Operation RESTORE HOPE; Chief, Joint Intelligence Center Rear for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY; Commander of the

Army's first Joint STARS Ground Station Module Company; and S2, 82d Aviation Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. MAJ Iwicki holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Decision Sciences and Computers and a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence. He is a graduate of the G2/ACE Chief Course, the Com-

mand and General Staff College, and the Post-Graduate Intelligence Program (PGIP). Readers can reach him via E-mail at g2depac@hq.c5.army.mil and telephonically at 49-6221-575250 or DSN (312) 370-5256.

Changes for the Army...Changes for Military Intelligence

The Chief of Staff of the Army's vision for the future has a clear mandate—transform the Army into a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations. Central to this transformation, and the first step in the process, is the new Interim Brigade Combat Team (I-BCT). The I-BCT will be able to respond rapidly to global crises, with the survivability and lethality to deal swiftly with small-scale contingencies (SSC). Its overmatch in C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance) will be unprecedented in today's Army.

What does this mean for the Military Intelligence Corps? A great deal! Intelligence will play a vital role, contributing to the high level of shared situational awareness and targeting required within this Brigade. It has increased capability across all intelligence disciplines and an expanded role in integrating all available Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Rather than direct support, the Military Intelligence company will be organic and fully integrated within the organization. This force design will enhance intelligence support to operations as well as increase unit cohesion, resulting in decreased deployment timelines. Collection assets and analytic abilities that normally reside in the MI Battalion will be an integral part of the Brigade.

The brigade possesses a package of military intelligence assets and personnel that has not been available to the brigade commander before. This provides the brigade commander with a clearer picture of the battle space. The capabilities to meet the conventional threat remain. However, they are significantly improved and better integrated.

The new force will also benefit from improved human intelligence and imagery collection. For example, the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition squadron will have a counterintelligence soldier in each of its reconnaissance squads to perform tactical missions. A separate human intelligence (HUMINT) platoon will satisfy the commander's collection requirements, and the brigade will employ its own platoon of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). The UAV platoon will give the brigade commander the ability to see the battlefield long-range with little or no risk to soldiers.

The Brigade MI Company has an ISR Analysis platoon and an ISR Integration platoon. These elements have the mission of integrating and coordinating all ISR assets available to the Brigade and will use state-of-the-art communications to access national and joint intelligence databases worldwide. This capability will foster collaboration and fusion of intelligence products at every echelon—from national down to brigade level. Additionally the Brigade will have an organic S-2X Section to coordinate and manage the significant HUMINT capability of the organization.

As the transformation process continues, intelligence remains focused on the commander. MI will remain engaged worldwide as a crucial component of this effort, delivering timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence in support of today's Army while transitioning to tomorrow's full-spectrum force.... Persuasive in Peace, Decisive in War, Preeminent in any conflict!

Stay tuned...**MIPB** will feature further information and developments regarding the Chief of Staff's Vision and the Initial and Interim Brigades in future issues.

Lieutenant Colonel Gus Greene is the Action Officer for the Futures Directorate at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center. Readers can contact him via E-mail at greeneg@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and by telephone at (520) 533-2010 or DSN 821-2010.

Task Force Hawk Targeting Intelligence Process

by Captains Donald E. Moore
and Scott Shoemaker

The V Corps-deployed Task Force Hawk was a major contributor to the success of Operation ALLIED FORCE. Although the TF did not use its attack helicopters and rockets in the operation, its targeting intelligence support provided the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air forces with crucial information about the southwestern portion of the Kosovo-Albania border. The G2 and ACE (Analysis and Control Element) provided a timely, accurate picture of the battlefield using a variety of sensors including the Joint STARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System), UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle), and national imagery exploitation. The intelligence elements provided essential support despite an ever-expanding mission scope and they achieved many intelligence successes.

The deployment of the intelligence elements that supported Task Force Hawk can serve as a model for force projection intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) operations. The TF ACE became the ground forces intelligence center of gravity during the final days of the Operation ALLIED FORCE air campaign. This article focuses on the principle of tactical tailoring and how it affected the targeting intelligence support provided by TF Hawk.

Initial Planning

Force projection IEW operations call for tactically tailored intelligence support. **FM 34-1, Intelligence Electronic Warfare Operations**, tells us that part of the tailoring requires a METT-T (mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and

time) analysis to determine the composition of the ACE or deployed intelligence support element (DISE). It also emphasizes maintaining habitual IEW support relationships between the forward-deployed intelligence element and higher echelon intelligence organizations. These two factors played a significant part in TF Hawk intelligence operations.

The V Corps ACE was to provide an intelligence element that could furnish targeting intelligence support for TF Hawk and the NATO air forces. The ACE leadership, based on guidance from the TF Commander and G2, immediately began the mission analysis to determine how best to support the commander. The specified task of the ACE was to perform target development and target tracking, which implied three other intelligence tasks:

- Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
- Situation development.
- Battle damage assessment (BDA).

A review of available assets revealed that V Corps had enough resources to accomplish this task and the implied tasks as well. The force cap constraint (the troops in METT-T) quickly emerged as the driving factor in the mission analysis process. This constraint eliminated the ability to shift more capability forward into the area of operations (AO)—a characteristic of split-based operations—and it affected the ability of the ACE to perform its specified and implied tasks. Creative thinking on how to overcome the force cap constraint was necessary.

Since Chapter 2 of **FM 34-1** clearly states that "*levels of intelligence are not tied to specific echelons*," we determined that the theater ACE and the Joint Analysis Center (JAC) should perform tactical situation development and the associated IPB. We coordinated with both elements, clarifying the level of resolution required for these tasks and the means through which our ACE would receive the intelligence information. When the initial coordination was complete, we briefed the TF Commander on the arrangements; he approved the concept and in a matter of days, our ACE left for Albania.

The plan called for the ACE to deploy only the personnel and systems that directly contributed to the targeting effort to Albania. In the initial stages of planning for deployment (up until the deployment), the TF had to adhere to a personnel resources cap. In actuality, this meant that only the ACE situation-development team did not deploy. We also leveraged the capabilities of the Aviation Regiment S2, the Corps Artillery G2, and the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) that deployed as part of TF Hawk to support the targeting mission.

Initial Operations

The Corps had successfully completed a recent Warfighter exercise, including two previous "ramp-up" exercises and a mission rehearsal exercise (MRE). Despite our training, however, the targeting intelligence for the Apaches and deep fires in Operation ALLIED FORCE was distinctly different than that to which the targeting section was accustomed in preparing and executing the earlier exercises.




Figure 1. Task Force Hawk Targeting Architecture.

The TF Hawk Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) was not attempting to shape the battlefield for a corps fight, thereby setting up the Divisions for success by influencing events up to 96 hours out. Additionally, we were not employing our Apaches in a doctrinal manner. The AH-64 helicopters are normally used "over the shoulder" to support the close fight or attack deeper to interdict forces that will be brought into the close battle from 24 to 96 hours out. TF Hawk was not there to influence a close battle—our normal mission—but rather our mission was to help NATO to destroy Serbian ground forces operating in Kosovo without losing any aircraft.

Once the ACE arrived in Albania, set up, and established our communications and intelligence connectivity, the work started in developing targets for the AH-64s and artillery. Before the deployment, the 11th Aviation Regiment chose engagement areas based on the best terrain in which to employ the Apaches, rather than selecting engagement areas in which the Serbs operated. The "boxes" quickly became references for ar-

reas of collection used instead of place names that had no grid location attached, such as "vicinity of Prizren." They served as a grid referencing system used throughout the TF.

Locating Serb ground forces was not difficult; the hard task was estimating where they would be in 24, 48, or 72 hours. The Serbs were conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations inside Kosovo and setting up defensive positions along the ground avenues of approach (these were sometimes vacant due to COIN operations in the immediate area). Hence, our targeting section started tracking KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) locations and operations. KLA tracking enabled the targeting team to predict where the Serbs had to react or attack. This also allowed us to plan and coordinate collection to validate the predictive analysis.

By doing this, the targeting team assumed a situation development role. The

targeting team no longer just identified, tracked, and monitored enemy equipment and locations, but also determined the parent unit and command and control relationships. This also led to analysis of the AO for both Serb and KLA units and determining which units were moving to reinforce or replace other units.

All our target development was preparatory to employing the Apaches and ATACMS (Army Tactical Cruise Missile System). The targeting section used all available sources of intelligence and plotted it, created and maintained a database, and tasked collection assets to fill the coverage gaps. Consequently, TF Hawk had a very accurate, current tactical picture of the western area of Kosovo which we updated daily and briefed in the DOCC. All units in TF Hawk had access to the resulting analysis and intelligence.

Change of Mission

During the deployment, a new challenge arose. Locally performed IPB and situation development

Key:	Demand-driven direct digital download system (imagery)
SD	Automated Deep Operations Coordination Communications System
ADOCCS	Advanced Electronic Processing and Dissemination System
AEPDS	Army Message Handling System
AMHS	Artillery
ARTY	Aviation
AVN	Combined Air Operations Center
CAOC	Communications Intelligence
COMINT	Crisis Response Operations in NATO Operating Systems
CRONOS	DOCC
DOCC	Deep operations coordination cell
ELINT	Electronic intelligence
ETRAC	Enhanced Tactical Radar Correlator
FAIO	Field artillery intelligence officer
FAST	Forward Area Support Terminal
GRCS	GUARDRAIL Common Sensor
IMINT	Imagery intelligence
IPF	Integrated Processing Facility (GUARDRAIL and GRCS)
JBS	Joint Broadcast Service
JDISS	Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JSTARS	Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
LAN	Local area network
LOCE	Linked Operational Intelligence Center, Europe
MGSM	Medium Ground Station Module
MIES	Modernized Imagery Exploitation System
Nat'l	National
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIST	National Intelligence Support Team
Rpts	Reports
RWS	Remote workstation
SDS	Secondary Imagery Dissemination System
SIGINT	Signals intelligence
SIPRNET	Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
WINCATS	Windows Cartographic Analysis Tool Set

were crucial to provide the best possible target development and support to targeting. The ACE leadership again had to develop a creative approach.

We considered the slow nature of the operation and the fact that TF Hawk attack helicopters and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) were not engaging enemy forces. We also assessed the available resources. We dedicated a few personnel to conduct IPB and situational development. This would provide the most current intelligence to the Task Force and augment what they were already receiving from intelligence support bases outside their AO. Eventually, this timely intelligence became the most sought-after tactical intelligence in the theater.

We also realized the need to integrate our ACE-generated IPB with that produced at the JAC and the theater ACE. We coordinated division of the "battlefield" into three areas. The JAC focused on eastern Kosovo, the theater ACE on western Kosovo, and the TF Hawk ACE on Serbian forces arrayed along the southern to western portion of the Kosovo-Albania border. This allowed all three intelligence



Setting up the ACE in Albania.


Photo courtesy of MAJ Stephen Iwicki.

centers to focus their IPB efforts and, in turn, resulted in analysis and products that are more detailed and avoided redundant efforts.

After a visit from the CINCEUR (U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe), Joint Task Force (JTF) Noble Anvil tasked us to pass our recommendations for targeting areas of interest and target recommendations to the NATO CAOC (Combined Air Operations Center) in Vicenza, Italy. The sensitive nature of the operation necessitated that our information meet a strict targetable standard, confirming


locations x-hours before attack. Due to the rules of engagement, we had to have an image of a recommended target or near-real-time surveillance of the target. The ROE also required checking for the possibility of collateral damage, KLA units in the area, and ensuring that the risk of injuring internal refugees was low. Since we were tracking known KLA locations and AOs, we ensured that we did not recommend targets that would endanger the KLA or refugees. Additionally, if the target was near the Albanian border, we checked to ensure that no friendly Albanian units were close to our targets. Recommended targets often had restrictions attached to them, e.g., "*do not attack east of the 47-grid line.*" Using Hunter UAV data, we also called in emerging targets for immediate attack to the CAOC's Flex Targeting Cell.

Once the TF's AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder counterbattery radar (also called "Q-37") became operational, we passed this targetable information to the CAOC as well. The Q-37 is highly accurate in locating the source of enemy artillery fires. Normally, the artillery would use this data for counterfire against these targets. However, since TF Hawk did not have authorization to



The entrance to the ACE targeting van.

Photo courtesy of MSG Roger Gibson.



SGT Mark Bentley installs the Surveillance Control Datalink in the MGSM prior to a mission.

Photo courtesy of SFC Gregory Thompson.

fire artillery or rockets, we forwarded this time-sensitive information to the CAOC for immediate air attack. This greatly increased the sensor-to-shooter timeline; what we had once measured in minutes and seconds now took hours.

We continued to task and request collection and to conduct analysis, except that now the targeting information was no longer solely for TF Hawk but rather for the NATO CAOC. The TF Hawk Collection Manager did this with great success despite our not having the priority for collection.

In the End

With the ability to track the tactical forces and operations of both the Serbs and the KLA in Kosovo and with the assistance of the DOCC, the TF Hawk Targeting Cell was able to assist the air campaign. This became very apparent when the KLA mounted what it called "Operation Arrow." During this KLA offensive, we were able to target the Serb forces attempting to halt them; we did this not to assist the KLA but rather to attack the Serb forces, knowing where and when they would be vulnerable.

The fact that TF Hawk was contributing significantly to Operation ALLIED FORCE was evident when the CAOC began calling the Task Force DOCC Targeting Cell for more target recommendations. This provided a major boost to soldiers' morale and helped us maintain a sharp focus on the mission.

Could the ACE have performed as well if TF Hawk's attack helicopters and MLRS had engaged Serbian forces? We will never know. We do know that we provided precise targeting intelligence to the NATO CAOC. Task Force Hawk proved that force projection operations principles using split-basing and tactical tailoring work. It also proved the value of a thorough mission analysis of the assigned intelligence mission. The TF Hawk deployment highlighted the necessity that we must perform all intelligence analysis tasks at each level. If the personnel resourcing to support this does not exist, then we must develop an alternate plan. By adapting doctrine and implementing creative problem-solving techniques, future force-projection operations will be as successful.


Hindsight

After deploying home and talking with soldiers that were in the

A Serbian M-87 (ORKAN) MRLS feels the effects of the Task Force Hawk ACE



Task Force Hawk ACE
DETECTS / TRACKS



Air Force
DELIVERS



Common Assessment
DESTROYED

CAOC, JAC, and JTF Noble Anvil, as well as forward air controllers, and Air Force pilots, we learned that TF Hawk was alone in achieving our detailed level of analysis and target tracking. The CAOC was attempting to execute a tactical air campaign with very restrictive ROE and without the necessary level of intelligence and target tracking that the mission required. Consequently, pilots sometimes flew after targets that were no longer there or based on information that the TF Hawk targeting cell did not consider timely or targetable. While TF Hawk only had the detailed intelligence picture for a portion of Kosovo, the CAOC needed that level of detail for all of Serbia.

In the future, if the Air Force is going to execute what is essentially a tactical air campaign without U.S. ground forces involvement, they will need the tactical intelligence and

analysis that the Army normally conducts. Air Force intelligence elements are not equipped to track ground forces. The Army should contribute all the assistance it can by providing a trained tactical intelligence and targeting cell to the Air Force for conducting a close tactical air campaign. It makes no difference who gets the credit for success, as long as we accomplish the mission and win the battle.*

Captain Moore is currently serving as the V Corps ACE Situation Development Section Chief. His previous assignments include S2, 1st Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division (AD); Assistant S2 and S2, 3d Brigade, 1st AD; and Platoon Leader and Executive Officer in 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division. Captain Moore graduated from the University of Central Arkansas with

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Captain Shoemaker is currently serving as the V Corps G2 ACE Targeting Officer in Charge. He served as the Targeting Intelligence Officer for TF Hawk in Albania supporting Operation ALIED FORCE. His previous assignments include S2 for MI Battalion (LI) (renamed the 204th MI Battalion), working with Aerial Reconnaissance Low (ARL) and the Predator UAV, and Company Executive Officer and Platoon Leader working with the Army's sea-based aerostats. He served six years enlisted time as a UH-1 crew chief before commissioning through Officer Candidate School. Captain Shoemaker has a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Relations from the University of Texas at Dallas. Readers can reach him via E-mail at g2ace04@hq.c5.army.mil and telephonically at 49-6221-575281 or DSN (312) 370-5281.

West Point Education for Regular Army Soldiers!

Each year the Army offers approximately 200 Regular Army soldiers admission to the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, New York, or the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School (USMAPS) at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Although some soldiers receive direct admission to West Point, the majority attends the USMAPS first.

USMAPS prepares soldiers for success at West Point through an intensive curriculum focused on English and mathematics. Applicants must be—

- * U.S. citizens.
- * Unmarried with no legal obligation to support dependents.
- * High school graduates or GED (General Educational Development High School Equivalency Credential) equivalent.
- * Under 23 years of age before July 1 of the year entering USMA (under 22 years of age before July 1 of the year entering the prep school).
- * Of high moral character.
- * With a sincere interest in attending West Point and becoming an Army officer.

Soldiers who meet the basic eligibility requirements, achieved SAT (College Boards Admissions Testing Scholastic Assessment Test) scores greater than 1000 or ACT (ACT, Inc. Assessment Program Test) composite scores of 20 or higher and earned good grades in a college-preparatory high school curriculum are especially encouraged to apply. For consideration for an appointment to West Point or the USMAPS in July 2000, applicants must meet all requirements by 1 April 2000. Interested soldiers should contact Major Rob Young via E-mail at tr9618@westpoint-emh2.army.mil and telephonically at (914) 938-5780 or DSN 688-5780.

Collection Management and Imagery Support to Deep Operations in Kosovo

by Warrant Officer One
Hector M. Cuevas, Jr.

The deployment of Task Force (TF) Hawk to Tirana, Albania, provided the U.S. Army V Corps with the opportunity to validate the doctrine of the G2 Intelligence Analysis and Control Element (ACE) and Army Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) systems' support to combat operations. The extraordinary advances in reliable communications connectivity permitted immediate access to a variety of theater and national databases and greatly facilitated rapid dissemination of intelligence, including national imagery.

The result was a powerful intelligence organization capable of increasingly self-sufficient analysis far beyond anything available only a few years ago. Nevertheless, the demands and expectations of combat commanders on the intelligence system have greatly increased as well.

Current time requirements for the simultaneous fusion of real-time or near-real-time (NRT) collection with other analysis and reporting stretch the boundaries of current-intelligence architecture capabilities. For example, same-day imagery is no longer sufficient. **The acceptable time scale for effective all-source fused intelligence support to the combat forces is now measured in minutes and hours.**

The V Corps' 205th Military Intelligence Brigade deployed intelligence support assets (the ACE) to the Operation ALLIED FORCE bombing campaign against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia

(FRY). The ACE was to conduct target development for Apache deep attack and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) and deep fires missions in the operation.

The ACE's principle challenge was the timely detection, identification, and targeting of FRY air defense and fielded ground forces (armor, artillery and troops), which made maximum use of mobility, camouflage, cover, deception, and even human shields, to avoid detection. The efforts on the part of the G2 ACE soldiers and the TF Hawk Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) came to fruition during the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA, also called the "UCK") offensive to control Mount Pastrik in southern Kosovo.

TF Hawk played a crucial role targeting Serb forces moving to counter the KLA offensive. The ACE brought together intelligence sources from tactical to national levels to track Serb forces and develop targets with the Corps DOCC. The DOCC nominated these Serb mobile targets for airstrikes by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aircraft ranging from F-16 fighters to B-1 and B-52 bombers.

Intelligence and Communications Architecture

The TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminals (TROJAN SPIRIT IIs or TS IIs) were the backbone of the intelligence architecture to support the TF's targeting operations. This architecture focused on two es-

sential elements: the architecture and TENCAP. First, the architecture plugged into the existing theater architecture. We established full connectivity with the intelligence production centers at the national (five) and theater (three) levels. These agencies and centers included—

- National Security Agency.
- Central Intelligence Agency.
- Defense Intelligence Agency.
- National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
- National Ground Intelligence Center.
- Joint Analysis Center.
- The 66th Military Intelligence Group.
- U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Technical Control and Analysis Element (TCAE).

In addition, TF Hawk fully employed its organic TENCAP systems, which reported directly to the Task Force G2. The Modernized Imagery Exploitation System (MIES) operated from sanctuary in Mainz-Finthen, Germany, exploiting point targets, directed search areas (DSA), and lines-of-communication (LOCs) in the TF Hawk area of interest (AI).

The 205th MI Brigade's Enhanced Tactical Radar Correlator (ETRAC) deployed to Brindisi, Italy, to process U-2 Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System (ASARS) downlinked imagery for TF Hawk. The Advanced Electronic Processing and Dissemination System (AEPDS) deployed with the ACE to Tirana and provided threat warning and target development of Serb radar systems. Figure 1 lists




Figure 1. TF Hawk TENCAP Capabilities and Operations in ALLIED FORCE.

TENCAP capabilities and the use we made of them during operations in ALLIED FORCE.

Finally, through the initiative of the imagery intelligence (IMINT) technicians at the TF, the ACE was able to receive NRT national imagery using a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software called "Datamaster." Using the TS II communications pipe, Datamaster queried and pulled images from the national imagery library at the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC). This capability enabled the ACE's imagery analysts to track and confirm targets in the 0-24 hour targeting cycle while the MIES and ETRAC would track and confirm targets in the 24-96 hour targeting cycle.

Having this added imagery capability in the ACE revolutionized the role that imagery plays in a tactical environment. The advantage of the TENCAP systems was that they were organic to V Corps and the TF Hawk Commander, exploiting imagery within the priorities the commander set. Not having these systems as organic assets would have required us to wait for imagery exploitation results in line with the theater and CAOC's priorities.

A National Intelligence Support Team deployed with TF Hawk. The NIST provided a critical direct link to national-level intelligence agencies. This was the first time a NIST deployed with its supported unit to conduct target development; previously, all NISTs provided intelligence only for situational awareness.

TF Hawk possessed two organic intelligence collectors during this operation, the Hunter unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and the V Corps AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder fire-detection radar (known as Q-37). These systems were timely contributors to the TF and theater collection effort. The accuracy of these systems, coupled with the intelligence analysis of the ACE, provided the best targeting data of Serb fielded forces operating in Kosovo.

The ACE used the Joint Broadcast System (JBS) to receive real-time video from the Hunter and Predator UAVs. The JBS is a receive-only, digital downlink, video display system that can receive several video channels (which include two Cable News Network (CNN) channels), multiple UAV feeds, and several encrypted data feeds (see Figure 2). Due to the Hunter's tether con-

straints, it was necessary to deploy the JBS system with the very-small aperture transmitter (VSAT) capability to allow distribution of the video feed back to TF Hawk.

The Q-37 Firefinder radar commenced operations with the establishment of the TF Hawk Forward Operating Base. The Task Force Commander placed the radar in a position that allowed it to locate artillery units firing along the Kosovo-Albania border. The ACE cross-cued artillery acquisitions from the radar to the Hunter UAVs to visually locate and confirm the location of the unit.

TF Hawk defined the area of operations (AO) as the Kosovo-Albania border and the valley from Pec to Prizren. This AO was advantageous because it allowed the ACE to concentrate collection and analysis in a division-size area. KLA attacks facilitated NATO airstrikes by forcing the VJ (Serb Army) to leave their covered and concealed positions to engage the KLA. Thus exposed, TF Hawk targeted these units, nominating them to the CAOC for destruction by NATO aircraft. The engagement of these targets further resulted in the repositioning of other VJ units for survivability or replacement of destroyed equipment in targeted VJ units.




Figure 2. TF Hawk Joint Broadcast System Connectivity.

The result was an increase in movement by the Serbian Army creating a vulnerability window. This allowed the ACE to get inside the Serb decision-making cycle and to schedule collection in areas of VJ movement and increase the accuracy of the targeting data.

Task Force Hawk Targeting

The TF Hawk ACE was the only intelligence organization in theater tracking Serb fielded forces with targeting accuracy. The key to success for the ACE analysts was their ability to focus on a specific section of the Serb Army for target development. This focus aimed at destroying Serb mobile forces at decisive points in the Serb counterinsurgency efforts.

Tracking the Serb-fielded forces would not have been possible without a carefully designed and executed collection plan. The TF Collection Manager worked closely with the ACE intelligence analysts to develop the situation and enhance the targeting process. The ACE held daily assessment meetings to develop the current situation with representatives from all the intelligence disciplines to pre-

dict future Serb actions and reactions, and to identify gaps in the enemy "picture."

The collection plan, based on the commander's guidance, prioritized the collection and analytical efforts to focus targeting on the Serb units critical to Serb operations against the KLA. We requested theater and national IMINT, human intelligence (HUMINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection support to confirm or deny the presence of Serb-fielded force activity. TF Hawk used its only collection assets, the Q-37 Firefinder radars and Hunter UAVs, to fill gaps in the collection schedule.

The Hunter UAV proved an excellent source of IMINT for the TF, and the Joint Task Force (JTF) J2 deemed the Hunter the most successful UAV in the theater. The keys to success were the commander's thorough guidance and the ACE analysis, which helped concentrate the collection effort.

The focusing of a Hunter mission on known Serb locations over a relatively small area allowed the UAV operators to search for camouflaged targets inside wooded and built-up areas. This concentrated

search activity set the Hunter apart from the other UAVs in theater. The other UAVs could not loiter over named areas of interest and dedicate time to locating camouflaged positions, thus allowing many VJ units to escape unscathed. Furthermore, the ACE analysts were able to re-task the Hunter dynamically to overfly activity in the area of emphasis for each mission.

The Hunter and the Q-37 data, coupled with collection results from theater and national systems, allowed the ACE to update the battle-field information constantly. The attention to detail and analytic effort are the critical factors for which other organizations in theater kept searching. The key to tracking fielded forces in combat proved to be—

- Careful analysis.
- Cross-cueing of collection systems.
- Requesting additional imagery coverage to fill gaps in the enemy picture.
- Updating a detailed enemy situation to confirm or deny templated positions.

Intelligence Operations Assessment

A highlight during Operation ALIED FORCE was the superb performance by the different theater collection management (CM) organizations. The National Collection Management Cell (NCMC) was the nerve center for all theater collection requirements during the operation; it managed all the theater intelligence-collection platforms operating in the Balkan Region. These platforms were collecting imagery as well as communications and electronic intelligence. The Joint Analysis Center (JAC) was the authority on national sensors.

While the NCMC produced no intelligence, it was critical that TF

Hawk establish a close working relationship with it to ensure that the NCMC-managed collectors met our intelligence requirements in a timely manner. The G2 provided liaison officers (LNOs) to the CAOC and the JAC to facilitate the flow of intelligence information to the TF Hawk ACE. These LNOs greatly increased the success of our TF's CM effort.

Task Force Hawk's intelligence operations serve as an example for future deployments of specialized TFs requiring a high level of detailed intelligence. Additionally, the TF validated several intelligence concepts.

First, the requirement for the ground maneuver commander to possess a UAV to perform reconnaissance and surveillance is essential. The Hunter UAV proved its worth repeatedly as it overflowed southern Kosovo. Hunter served as the commander's "eyes" over enemy territory, providing accurate and timely targeting data. Additionally, these UAVs must be in direct support (DS) of the maneuver commander—not pooled at a higher echelon in a general support (GS) role—to ensure that the commander can monitor the enemy's




Figure 3. ACE Softcopy Imagery Workstation.

actions at those critical times the commander identifies.

Imagery continues to be the cornerstone of targeting support and ground situational awareness. Access to NRT national and theater imagery plays a significant role in supporting ground mobile target prosecution by Army deep attack shooters.

This access to imagery is via—

- ACE Softcopy Imagery Workstation (see Figure 3).
- Joint STARS (Joint Surveillance

Target Attack Radar System) Workstation (JSWS) in the Medium Ground Station Module (MGSM) (see Figure 4).

- MIES.
- ETRAC.

A crucial concept that we must sustain is the exploitation of national imagery by 96D imagery analysts at the ACE. Several times these analysts provided direct notification of Serb military equipment locations within hours after acquisition of the image. Furthermore, the exploitation of national imagery by theater exploitation centers was insufficient to support all TF Hawk requirements.

The employment of the ETRAC and MIES to exploit Army targets gave the target development process greater leverage in shortening the time from the sensor to the shooter. The TENCAP systems provided this flexibility and validated the need for their support at the corps level.

The overall success of the TF Hawk intelligence effort was due to the professional soldiers of the ACE. The dedication of these soldiers, using our doctrinal IPB (intelligence preparation of the battlefield) process and the target development process, became our




Figure 4. MGSM Joint STARS Workstation Operations.




Figure 2. TF Hawk Joint Broadcast System Connectivity.

The result was an increase in movement by the Serbian Army creating a vulnerability window. This allowed the ACE to get inside the Serb decision-making cycle and to schedule collection in areas of VJ movement and increase the accuracy of the targeting data.

Task Force Hawk Targeting

The TF Hawk ACE was the only intelligence organization in theater tracking Serb fielded forces with targeting accuracy. The key to success for the ACE analysts was their ability to focus on a specific section of the Serb Army for target development. This focus aimed at destroying Serb mobile forces at decisive points in the Serb counterinsurgency efforts.

Tracking the Serb-fielded forces would not have been possible without a carefully designed and executed collection plan. The TF Collection Manager worked closely with the ACE intelligence analysts to develop the situation and enhance the targeting process. The ACE held daily assessment meetings to develop the current situation with representatives from all the intelligence disciplines to pre-

dict future Serb actions and reactions, and to identify gaps in the enemy "picture."

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


Figure 3. ACE Softcopy Imagery Workstation.




Figure 4. MGSM Joint STARS Workstation Operations.

The difficulty of providing this support increased because the United States was not supporting the Kosovo ground force, the KLA. The targeting success of TF Hawk, combined with the U.S. Air Force striking Task Force Hawk-nomi-

Warrant Officer One Hector Cuevas is currently the V Corps ACE IMINT and Common Ground Station (CGS) Officer in Charge (OIC) in Heidelberg, Germany. While deployed with the ACE as a part of TF Hawk, he was the Imagery Requirements Officer and the IMINT Day-Shift OIC. This is his first assignment after completing Warrant Officer

Candidate School and the Warrant Officer Basic Course. His assignments as an enlisted soldier were with the 66th MI Brigade in Augsburg, Germany, working in the USAREUR Imagery Exploitation System (UIES) and the Modernized Imagery Exploitation System (MIES); he also worked in the in the Imagery Exploitation Company, 205th MI Battalion, U.S. Army, Pacific at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. Readers can contact him via E-mail at g2ace01@hq.c5.army.mil or hector_cuevas@hotmail.com and by telephone at 011-49-6221-575268 or DSN 314-370-5268.

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The First Combat Deployment of a G2 ACE TEAM

by Major Stephen K. Iwicki

The V Corps ACE broke new ground during Operation ALLIED FORCE. For the first time in the history of the Army Intelligence Branch, an analysis and control element (ACE) deployed to a declared combat zone and provided timely, accurate intelligence support to combat commanders.

Task Force Hawk represented the first combat test of our G2 ACE team doctrine. The majority of the Corps G2 and ACE deployed as a corps-equivalent headquarters commanded by a Lieutenant General. This was a combat deployment because the ACE directly engaged in the fight. We provided accurate, critical intelligence products to both the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) and to the Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (CINCEUCOM). These products came in many forms including target identification, target tracking, situational development, and a daily intelligence summary (INTSUM)

(see Figure 1). Army intelligence was a major contributor to the success of Operation ALLIED FORCE.

The operation began when we received a deployment warning order effective for planning purposes. The Commanding General gave the staff three clear planning factors for our mission analysis:

- Conduct 24-hour operations.
- Execute at least one deep attack per night.
- Ensure the availability of the correct intelligence and communications packages to execute this mission successfully.

The mission required V Corps to deploy a tailored deep-strike task force (TF). The imposed force cap prevented deploying all of the Corps G2 and ACE. Since we were deploying on a focused targeting mission, we assumed risks in

other areas. We understood we would deploy to a bare base, hostile environment. We knew that the timeliness and accuracy of our intelligence analysis was critical to mission success and to force protection.

Intelligence Support to TF Hawk

The intelligence battlefield operating system provided exceptional support to our deployment (see Figure 2). The 205th MI Brigade brought all its assets to the fight. The 1st MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation) (AE) deployed to Italy and conducted sustained Guardrail



Photos courtesy of SFC Gregory Thompson.




Figure 1. Production Requirements.

Key:

AEPDS-Advanced Electronic Processing and Dissemination System
CI-Counterintelligence
ETRAC-Enhanced Tactical Radar Correlator
HUMINT-Human intelligence
IDP-Internal displaced person
IMINT-Imagery intelligence
INTSUMs-Intelligence summaries
IPF-Integrated Processing Facility
JBS-Joint Broadcast System
JDSS-Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JSTARS-Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
KLA-Kosovo Liberation Army
LOC-Line of communication
LRSU-Long-range surveillance unit
MGSM-Medium ground station module
MIES-Modernized Imagery Exploitation System
SIGINT-Signals intelligence
UAV-Unmanned aerial vehicle




Figure 2. Intelligence Systems Supporting TF Hawk.

Common Sensor (GRCS) signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection operations.

The 302d MI Battalion (Operations) conducted split-based operations with the majority of the ACE deployed to Albania. The G2 ACE elements left in Heidelberg, Germany, provided sanctuary support and direct support (DS) to the remaining corps staff elements supporting the operation from garrison. The 302d MI Battalion's TENCAP (Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities) assets deployed to a variety of locations. The Advanced ELINT (electronic intelligence) Processing and Dissemination System (AEPDS) collocated with the ACE in Albania. The Enhanced Tactical Radar Correlator (ETRAC) deployed to Italy and provided continuous analysis of U-2 imagery data. The Modernized Imagery Exploitation System (MIES) remained in Germany, but provided exploitation of national imagery in DS of TF Hawk. Finally, the 165th MI Battalion (Counterintelligence) provided CI and human intelligence (HUMINT) support to the deployed forces in Albania.

Additionally, we had almost instantaneous approval for virtually

any system or capability we requested from outside V Corps. The Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) system deployed to provide DS to our targeting mission.

The Joint Broadcast System (JBS) provided broadcast dissemination of a variety of products including data from the Hunter UAVs. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radars System (Joint STARS) E-8 aircraft deployed to support all

of Operation ALLIED FORCE. Additional Joint STARS Workstations (JSWS) deployed throughout the theater. A National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) deployed with the ACE and brought a variety of specialized intelligence support systems.

The quick response of these outside organizations resulted in their personnel and equipment arriving in Germany just before our deployment. This allowed us to successfully integrate them into the ACE team and incorporate their personnel and equipment into our overall phased deployment plan.

Initial Deployment

The ACE deployed three soldiers with the 21-person Task Force "torch party," the initial personnel to hit the ground in Albania before arrival of the advance party. Our Systems Control Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC), CI/Force Protection Technician, and Deputy ACE Chief were the part of that team.

Our mission had three primary objectives. First, working with the G3 Sergeant Major, we had to sur-



The only road to the Main Command Post.

vey the available terrain and agree upon an acceptable terrain management plan for the main command post (CP) and life support area (LSA). We had to factor in line of sight calculations for TROJAN SPIRIT II (TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal II), AEPDS, Joint STARS Medium Ground Station Module (MGSM), and satellite communications for the JSWS.

Second, we had to plan for the reception of the advance party, establishment of the LSA, and emplacement of the ACE as part of the overall main CP. This involved extensive coordination with the various staff sections to sequence the arrival and emplacement of vehicles through the one entry point to the perimeter properly and to prioritize communications support.

Our third objective was successfully establishing ACE operations in Albania. The "first battle" we fought and won was against the rain and mud—many of you will recall seeing pictures of the muddy conditions and lines of vehicles buried to their axles. It took us one complete day and the dedicated use on an armored personnel carrier to pull our five-ton vans through the mud and into the ACE compound. In the case of the AEPDS, it took a 60,000-pound bulldozer to pull this heavy system into place.

Establishing the ACE

Our "second battle" focused on—

- Establishing an operational ACE in our deployed environment.
- Starting 24-hour operations.
- Catching up on the few days of situational awareness we lost due to our deployment flow.

The ACE was extremely successful in quickly establishing our van configuration, applying our own power grid, and establishing con-

nectivity with the rest of the intelligence community. The ACE NCOs safely and skillfully executed our set-up drills and overcame any obstacle that impeded our success. Within 24 hours of dragging our vehicles through the mud, we were operational.

The Battle


Our most important mission focused on destroying the Serbian forces in Kosovo. We executed this mission in a variety of ways. First, we accomplished this primary mission by providing the necessary detailed intelligence to support potential Apache deep attack and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) deep fires. A discussion of the details of our analytical approach to this requirement is in "TF Hawk Targeting Intelligence Process" by Captains Moore and Shoemaker on page 11.

Second, we provided targeting intelligence to other elements within Operation ALLIED FORCE. We continually provided target nominations against Serbian fixed and mobile ground targets in Kosovo. We passed these targets to Joint Task Force Noble Anvil, the CAOC, and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Air power provided the destructive punch, but often Army intelligence detected, identified, and tracked the target.

Third, we were, by default, the tactical ground analysis center for the operation. TF Hawk analysts tracked the ground situation in western Kosovo in excruciating detail (down to individual pieces of equipment). We tracked the general situation on 1:50,000 scale maps and targeting intelligence products at the 1:12,500 scale. Not only did we provide targeting intelligence, but we also tracked and analyzed Serbian and Albanian forces, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or "UCK") units, and internal displaced persons (IDPs).

Tracking IDPs posed a significant challenge that fell upon our two-soldier HUMINT Analysis Center (HAC). This non-doctrinal mission was critical to the success of potential deep operations and later came to the forefront of ALLIED FORCE missions as well. Of course, we could not attack refugees that coincidentally located in our target area. Therefore, the HAC monitored IDP concentrations and movements and predicted the impact of the IDPs on future operations. Finally, they were responsible for ensuring every TF Hawk nominated target was free of IDPs before we cleared it for attack.

Additionally, we fused the intelligence information we received into predictive analysis. Since our mission effort had expanded beyond just targeting, the ACE began production of a daily INTSUM on 29 April 1999. The INTSUM quickly drew the attention of our higher and adjacent headquarters, as well as the national intelligence community. We deliberately classified the product SECRET and caveated it "not releasable to foreign nationals"; we retained originator control of its release because it contained specific reference to enemy activity in our



SSG Jenifer Dees briefs LTC Thomas Kelley, ACE Chief, concerning MGSM.

At 0200 on what was generally a slow night when our collection assets were not particularly productive, we decided to go on the hunt. Pattern analysis had indicated a trend in enemy activity along a particular road at about 0400. During the next hour, we focused several collection assets on this specific line of communication. We detected what at first appeared to be a tarp-covered truck.

Following the movement of the vehicle and after viewing the target from all sides, we confirmed it was in fact an M-87 Serbian MRLS—the number one high-payoff target. We immediately contacted the CAOC and they confirmed the target. We obtained an immediate strike on the target. The images at the bottom of page 14 show an example of the effects of our efforts.

Army Intelligence, Always Out Front!

planned engagement areas. We restricted the INTSUM distribution to organizations with a clear "need to know" and the G2 personally approved any changes to the distribution list. Within a few weeks of starting our INTSUM, the distribution list had increased to include the ALLIED FORCE component commanders and the CINC.

Blueprint for Success

The difference between TF Hawk intelligence and that of other organizations boiled down to a difference in levels of detail and application of the fusion process. The issue concerning levels of detail covers four main areas. The first area involved **having the necessary skill sets** and a thorough understanding of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and analysis of ground forces, particularly mobile forces. Most of the other intelligence players in Operation ALLIED FORCE were neither resourced nor equipped to do that.

The **level of visualization** applied to the analytical process is the second area. In this scenario, analysts had to work on maps with a maximum 1:50,000-kilometer (km) scale to develop an accurate picture of the battlefield.

The third area encompassed **having proper combat focus** and motivation. With the exception of our ACE and the 26th MEU, the other intelligence organizations worked outside the area of operations. Our soldiers were living in tough conditions, working closely with a highly focused TF Command Group, constantly hearing gunfire, and most importantly, continually hearing and seeing armed Apache helicopters and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Coalition aircraft flying overhead. That realism reinforced the seriousness of our mission and motivated them to succeed.

The fourth area was essentially **hard work** in a difficult analytical situation. Our soldiers constantly initiated analyst-to-analyst discussions both within and outside of the ACE. It was the constant situational awareness on every soldier's part that led to our success. We did not have "stove pipe" analysis; we had complete cross-discipline awareness where everyone was current on the situation and knew what to look for within their respective intelligence disciplines. This made all the difference in our analytical process. Our imagery analysts knew what types of units and equipment would be in a particular frame

The difference between TF Hawk intelligence and that of other organizations boiled down to a difference in levels of detail and application of the fusion process

of imagery they exploited because they had situational awareness and a detailed map to turn to if they were unsure. The same was true for the soldiers who monitored and exploited UAV and Joint STARS imagery, analyzed signals patterns, or developed battle damage assessments. Being in that hostile environment magnified the scope of realism for our soldiers and drove them to succeed.

The Fusion Process

Our ultimate success in intelligence fusion lay in **communications and flexibility**. Our analysts constantly talked with each other, the ACE leadership, and most importantly with the TF general officers. We were fortunate in that all the TF senior leaders would visit the ACE regularly and freely communicate with our soldiers. If we had questions or were uncertain about some guidance, we could ask questions for clarification. The Commanding General willingly shared his time with us and always had an open door if we needed to discuss an issue. This was a major combat multiplier to our ability to meet his needs; we clearly understood his requirements and the level of detail he desired.

The extensive cross-talk within the ACE ensured that everyone knew what was important and how easily one small piece of informa-

tion—by itself meaningless—could solve piece of another analysts puzzle. We shared information beyond the various “walls” of the intelligence disciplines and held several ACE-wide assessment meetings each day. We conducted two daily shift-change briefings, which all ACE personnel attended; each section briefed significant events in their respective areas.

Flexibility became our battle theme. We applied it to our targeting process, situational development process, collection management, and our predictive intelligence assessments. We were always willing to accept that new pieces of information could, and often did, change our “read” of the battlefield. We were willing to cross-cue and dynamically adjust ongoing collection based on a single relevant piece of new information. We were flexible enough

to admit a bad assessment and issue a correction. We were also flexible enough to realize that aggressive predictive analysis was risky, and we could be wrong. Sometimes these risks paid off; we were bold enough to do it because it was the right thing to do.

Conclusion

Throughout this article, I have delineated the reasons why we called this a combat deployment of the ACE. The other articles in this issue provide more specifics to confirm that assertion—please take the time to read them. Throughout our deployment, we provided intelligence information that resulted in the destruction of Serbian tanks, artillery, air defense systems, radars, and MRLs.*

Major Steve Iwicky is currently serving as the V Corps ACE Chief. During the

TF Hawk deployment, he was the Deputy ACE Chief. He has served in intelligence and staff positions at all echelons of the Army, except division staff. Significant positions he has held include Chief of Current Intelligence, U.S. Army Central Command during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM; XVIIIth Airborne (ABN) Corps G2 Planner for Operation RESTORE HOPE; Chief, Joint Intelligence Center Rear for Operation UP-HOLD DEMOCRACY; Commander of the Army's first Joint STARS Ground Station Module Company; and S2, 82d Aviation Brigade, 82d ABN Division. MAJ Iwicky holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Decision Sciences and Computers and a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence. He is a graduate of the G2/ACE Chief Course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Post-Graduate Intelligence Program. Readers can reach him via E-mail at g2depac@hq.c5.army.mil and telephonically at 49-6221-575250 or DSN (312) 370-5256.

239th MI Company Needs MI Soldiers

The 239th Military Intelligence Company, located in Perryville, Arkansas, is seeking MI soldiers in a variety of military occupational specialties. The 239th MI Company is a direct support MI company with the 39th Infantry Brigade (Separate), one of three enhanced separate brigades (eSBs) in the light Active/Reserve Component 7th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado. Our mission is to provide combat intelligence to an Army National Guard eSB. The unit has an analysis and control support element (ACSE), analysis and control team (ACT), counterintelligence (CI) team, interrogation team, and three four-soldier ground surveillance teams.

The company's critical vacancies include—

- Intel Analyst, 96B10, SPC/E4, 4 vacancies (2 in over-strength structure).
- Intel Analyst, 96B10, PFC/E3, 1 vacancy.
- Imagery Analyst, 96D10, SPC/E4, 1 vacancy.
- SIGINT Analyst, 98C20, SGT/E5, 1 vacancy.
- SIGINT Analyst, 98C10, SPC/E4, 1 vacancy.
- GSR Team Leader, 96R20, SGT/E5, 1 vacancy (projected).
- GSR Operator, 96R10, SPC/E4, 4 vacancies (projected).
- CI Agent, 97B10, SPC/E4, 1 vacancy.
- Interrogator, 97E2L, SGT/E5, 1 vacancy (must have a language).
- Interrogator, 97E1L, SPC/E4, 1 vacancy (must have a language).

Interested soldiers must meet all prerequisites specified in AR 611-201. The unit's modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) is language-nonspecific.

For more information, contact Sergeant Michael J. Allen. You can reach him via E-mail at allenmj@ar-armg.ngb.army.mil and by commercial telephone at (501) 889-2417. His RCAS number is (501) 212-7901 or DSN 962-7901. You can also write to him at the 239th MI Company, 705 Houston Avenue, Perryville, AR 72126-9462.

Theater-Level Interrogation

by Captain Kent L. Webber

Operational-level human intelligence (HUMINT) provides the link between tactical and strategic HUMINT operations. For the past year, dedicated professionals in the 202d MI Battalion, along with HUMINT experts at the Third Army, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and national level have redefined and strengthened the HUMINT linkage while maximizing and fully integrating collection operations to support U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT) and CENTCOM intelligence requirements. We began by refining the operational HUMINT mission, roles, and functions and subsequently institutionalized the process by developing detailed tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) as well as rewriting applicable portions of ARCENT and CENTCOM war plans.

The 202d MI Battalion is a theater-level force-projection collection and exploitation battalion with the missions to conduct counterintelligence (CI) operations, interrogation, debriefing, and document exploitation. Headquartered at Fort Gordon, Georgia, it is part of the 513th MI Brigade, INSCOM's (U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command) contingency force. Its HUMINT and counterintelligence assets (HUMINT collectors and CI agents) routinely deploy together as tactical HUMINT teams in support of operations in the CENTCOM, U.S. European Command, and the U.S. Southern Command theaters.

Theater Level

HUMINT is the intelligence information derived from the intelligence collection discipline that uses hu-

man beings as both sources and collectors. HUMINT encompasses many sub-disciplines to include interrogation and debriefing operations, which are the foremost HUMINT mission within the 202d MI Battalion and the focus of this discussion (see Figure 1). Theater-level interrogation and debriefing operations consist of the following collection activities:

- Interrogation of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and civilian detainees.
- Debriefing of refugees and other civilians.
- Strategic debriefing.
- Document exploitation (DOCEX).

Comprehensive Coverage

HUMINT collection assets at echelons corps and below (ECB) and echelons above corps (EAC) complement one another to provide comprehensive coverage at all levels. Theater-level interrogation focuses on the theater commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR), allowing assets at ECB to concentrate on the rapidly changing events of the tactical battlefield. Army divisions task-organize small teams of 97E HUMINT Collectors and 351E Human Intelligence Collection Technicians to collect against brigade PIR.

ECB HUMINT collectors exploit sources at locations where they are best positioned to answer the tactical commander's immediate PIR, such as the brigade and division collection points. Military police (MPs) speed EPWs rearward to the Theater Internment Facility (TIF). Corps personnel debrief prisoners in the Corps Interrogation Facility

(CIF) and transport them rearward within 72 hours of arrival. Theater-level interrogation and debriefing provides a longer-term, more stabilized environment in which to exploit sources with farther-reaching but less time-sensitive operational and strategic knowledge. When theater interrogators uncover information of relevance to ECB units, they immediately issue SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment) reports.

On the DOCEX side, theater-level facilities allow ECB collectors to concentrate on documents of immediate relevance to the tactical situation. HUMINT collectors and S2s at each level screen and exploit documents to answer their commanders' PIR and speed the less time-sensitive documents to the theater level for exploitation. DOCEX elements at theater can better handle large numbers of documents such as those abandoned by a retreating enemy or left in a weapons manufacturing plant.

The Army does not have a monopoly on interrogation. Ensuring a concerted effort, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps also employ interrogators at various echelons. Theater-level interrogation facilities, however, are joint assets with the ground forces commander (ARCENT) having executive agent responsibility. The CENTCOM J2X, a subordinate staff element of the CENTCOM J2, manages the coordination of HUMINT collection throughout the theater. To ensure unity of effort, the J2X manages, coordinates, and deconflicts selected national and Service HUMINT and CI missions, including exploitation of captured personnel, documents, and equipment.

Executing the Theater HUMINT Collection Mission

Each conflict is different and requires specially tailored HUMINT collection and analysis support for maximum effect. The 202d MI Battalion is ready to leverage its assets against any contingency in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR), whether in support of a small-scale task force or in a fully mature joint theater. A modularized ramp-up concept allows us to start small and grow, or to deploy en masse to meet large-scale requirements. In keeping with the spirit of the CI/HUMINT charter, our interrogation assets will be on the ground early to reinforce the tactical effort and serve as a conduit to bring strategic level resources to the AOR.¹

Peacetime. Peacetime activities and training flow directly into our

tation has executive agency for all CI activity in the CENTCOM AOR. Our 97Es and 351Es augment this effort by providing interpreter and translation support. Second, members of the 202d MI Battalion participate in established **overt debriefing** programs

We also furnish **analyst support to HUMINT collection and DOCEX**. Analysts are a part of every facet of peacetime training and perform their wartime missions in support of overt debriefings and reporting. The 202d MI Battalion has established a scaled-down DOCEX cell in garrison that mirrors our wartime Joint Document Exploitation Center (JDEC). Using the same equipment and procedures, we conduct document exploitation in support of theater collection requirements.

Finally, we are active in **Reserve integration**. The 202d MI Battalion aggressively fosters strong ties

with RC units to ensure synchronization of effort, missions, and mission essential task lists (METLs).

The 142d MI Battalion in Utah plays an active role in DOCEX and interrogation support. Members of the 142d MI Battalion (Utah Army National Guard) have pioneered efforts in split-based DOCEX and have made significant contributions to the JDEC standing operating procedures (SOPs). The 323d MI Battalion (USAR) from Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, contributes interrogators, strategic debriefers, and analysts to support exercises and wartime contingencies.

As Crises Erupt. From the very start of crises, the theater J2X provides collection requirements to the 202d MI Battalion. The 202d MI Battalion deploys forces commensurate with the level of conflict. During low-level crises or peacekeeping operations, the interrogation company will deploy an operations element and several mobile interrogation teams (MITs). MITs consist of interrogators and analysts. They deploy in HMMWVs (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles) with sufficient equipment and automation to "stand alone." MITs provide interrogation support wherever needed. They might conduct screening or augment HUMINT at ECB, or they may travel to a refugee control point. Whenever MITs deploy, their agenda is to screen against theater PIR and either exploit in place, or arrange sources' transportation to the rear. ECB collectors can facilitate the EAC collection mission by identifying sources that meet theater-level selection criteria. To facilitate this, the 202d MI Battalion submits production requests through the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), asking for support.

As crises expand into larger conflicts and the source pool grows, the military police establish a theater




Figure 1. The Continuum of Theater-Level HUMINT Activities.

wartime mission. On a daily basis, the 202d MI Battalion performs many diverse real-world missions.

First, the battalion provides **support to Field Office-Southwest Asia (FO-SWA)**. The 202d MI Bat-

with the Reserve Component (RC). Soldiers from RC units participate in most training events, deploy alongside 202d soldiers, and contribute to all phases of planning. The Battalion frequently sends mo-

internment facility (TIF). More assets from the 202d MI Battalion arrive and the operations element begins to expand into the theater HUMINT collection facilities.

During Operation DESERT STORM, "interrogation units screened, interrogated or debriefed 49,350 enemy prisoners of war, and gathered enough captured enemy documents for DOCEX to fill 18 trailer trucks."

—Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, September 1992

Mid- Through High-Level Conflict and Beyond. As the theater situation matures, the 202d MI Battalion establishes three joint collection facilities: the Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF), the Joint Intelligence Debriefing Center (JIDC), and the Joint Document Exploitation Center (JDEC). (The JDEC is not a HUMINT collection facility since it does not perform HUMINT exploitation; it is however usually operated by HUMINT collection personnel (MOS 97E) due to their language and document handling training.) Active Component soldiers and Reservists, airmen, sailors, and marines arrive from diverse locations and integrate into all facets of the facilities. National and strategic-level agencies such as DIA-DOCEX send liaison officers to assist and watch over their respective interests.

The mission of the JIF is to provide intelligence information to CENTCOM and its subordinate commands through the exploitation of EPWs and civilian detainees. The JIF also provides limited capability to exploit documents until the full establishment of the JDEC. The JIF maintains the capability of providing interrogation support to ECB through the deployment of MITs.

Proper screening is vital to determine if a source meets selection criteria and warrants further exploitation. If the source meets the ini-

tial criteria, the person will be questioned further to focus exploitation, allowing us to match the appropriate interrogator to the appropriate source; for example, sources with knowledge of aircraft, ships, or amphibious operations will receive interrogation from experts in the Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps. After full exploitation, the interrogator will prepare a report for release by the operations section.

The JDEC provides intelligence support to CENTCOM and its subordinate commands through the exploitation of captured enemy documents (CEDs). While limited document exploitation occurs at lower echelons, the JDEC is the only facility in theater designed to handle large quantities of documents, computer disks, videotapes, and other sources of multimedia information. The JDEC is dependent on maneuver unit S2s to identify CEDs of intelligence value and to facilitate their movement rearward through normal logistics channels. Document flow will vary from a steady trickle of maps to a sudden deluge of papers, videotapes, computer disks, etc.

As documents arrive in the facility, JDEC personnel sort them according to media type, language, PIR, and time sensitivity. Facility personnel log documents into a database and assign numbers for tracking them through the exploitation process. Next, the scanning section converts hard copy documents into electronic formats to ease further processing. A screen-




SFC Donald Spencer briefs U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Larry L. Poe on JIF procedures.

ing team reads the documents, conducts partial translations of relevant sections, and nominates them for exploitation. The exploitation section conducts the appropriate translation (full, summary, or extract) and generates a report. The operations section in the JDEC releases the final report to consumers. As required, the JDEC will send less time-sensitive documents to an RC sanctuary base in CONUS for exploitation.

For all the strengths of the JIF, it is nonetheless an interrogation facility with minimum comforts in the extraction of information from potentially hostile sources. The JIDC by contrast, provides a much more comfortable and non-belligerent setting to debrief friendly sources (such as returning prisoners of war) and to interrogate high-ranking and important prisoners whose potential intelligence value merits treat-

Photos courtesy of SGT Jay Rivera, 513th MI Brigade Public Affairs Office.



SGT Meeks of A/142d MI Battalion (UT ARNG) conducts an interrogation during Southern Knight 1999, while SPC Toby Honderd, A/202d MI Battalion, observes.

ment commensurate with their higher standing. Sources at the JIDC are likely to satisfy strategic requirements in a more *quid pro quo* arrangement. They may receive incentives and the fulfillment of certain wishes unavailable at the JIF. In the event that such sources arrive at the JIF, a liaison officer coordinates their relocation to the JIDC.

New Initiatives in the 202d MI Battalion

The JIF, JDEC, and JIDC missions are not new to the 202d MI Battalion. Prior to the Gulf War, the mission to establish these facilities existed, but only in concept.³ As the war began, the 202d overcame training and resource challenges, eventually establishing and operating the facilities with a high degree of success. As a lesson learned, the 202d MI Battalion began formalized planning and training after that war, concentrating on the physical setup and internal procedures.

Over the last 14 months, we have worked diligently with CENTCOM and the sister Services to solidify all external arrangements through

extensive coordination. Furthermore, we have worked to institutionalize and document all procedures through updated war plans, SOPs, and TTP. Some of our initiatives include—

- Significant input to revised war plans.
- Meetings with the CENTCOM J2X and the joint Services to solidify exactly how many sailors, airmen, and marines will come to the collection facilities and what units will send them.
- Development of concepts of operations staffed through the 513th MI Brigade, INSCOM, ARCENT, and CENTCOM.
- Terrain walks in the AOR with the CENTCOM J2X, the U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT) Provost Marshal Office, and the 800th Military Police Brigade.
- Partial fielding of new climate-controlled DRASH (Deployable Rapid Assembly Shelter) tents for the JIF and JDEC.
- Revised SOPs and TTP for each facility.

- Modernized automation architecture.
- Meetings with representatives of the CENTCOM J6 (communication officer) to solidify communication paths for receiving requirements, sending reports, and conducting split-based operations.
- Significant progress toward resolving Reserve WARTRACE⁴ issues.
- Joint-level exercises with participation from the joint Services, RC units, and the CENTCOM J2X.
- Peacetime training and deployment initiatives that mirror war-time activities.

Conclusion

Theater-level interrogation and debriefing provide an essential link in comprehensive HUMINT collection across the spectrum of the battlefield. Together with the ECB HUMINT collectors and experts at CENTCOM, the 202d MI Battalion is able to provide seamless HUMINT coverage in support of all contingencies. The operation of the theater collection facilities requires constant training and unity of effort. Last spring, the 202d MI Battalion conducted Southern Knight 1999, a preeminent interrogation exercise that included the CENTCOM J2X, joint Services, and more than 150 Reservists and ECB active duty soldiers. The exercise was a tremendous success for interrogators "in the box" and for planners at all levels.

In spring 2000, the 202d MI Battalion will build on Southern Knight '99 and create an exercise that will eclipse all previous efforts. The exercise will be more comprehensive, testing every aspect of the battalion's mission to include command and control, logistics, HUMINT, and counterintelligence. The exercise will bring the concepts discussed in this article to life and

(Continued on page 32)

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Often readers call *MIPB* for information on past articles. We have provided this index of feature articles from the last five years for your reference. These articles are available on the *MIPB* website (<http://138.27.35.36/>).

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demonstrate the enthusiasm and professionalism of the 202d MI Battalion and their affiliated RC units. We invite intelligence professionals throughout the U.S. armed forces to observe or participate in the exercise, and see these concepts executed on the ground, in a realistic manner. Short of war, there is no better way to experience theater-level interrogation and to catch the contagious enthusiasm of the soldiers and leaders in the 202d MI Battalion.*

My thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Michael W. Pick, Chief Warrant Officer Two Jason Z. Fisher, and Chief Warrant Officer Four Patrick J. Foxen (USA, Retired) for their significant input to this article.



CPT Kent Webber gives LTG Tommy Franks, 3d Army Commander, a tour of the JIF and JDEC during Southern Knight 1999.

Endnotes

1. U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, *Army CI/HUMINT XXI Concept of Operations: Providing a Seamless Linkage Strategic to Tactical (White Paper)*, 1 November 1997.
2. Headquarters, Department of the Army, **FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation**, 28 September 1992.
3. Based on conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Anita Fioravanti, Commander of the Interrogation Company (A/202) during Operation DESERT STORM.
4. "WARTRACE" in simple terms is a planning association of an RC unit with the organization with which it would go to

war or to which it would be subordinate.

It is somewhat dated but still used to describe associations ranging from training to actual war plans.

Commissioned in the Regular Army through the Reserve Officer Training corps from the University of Texas at Austin, Captain Kent Webber received a Master of Arts degree in Latin American Studies. He is the Commander, A Company (Interrogation), in the 202d MI Battalion. His prior assignments include Assistant S3 for training in the 297th MI Battalion, 513th Military Intelligence Brigade; S4, 101st MI Battalion; 1st Infantry Division (ID); HHSC

Executive Officer; 103d MI Battalion; Assistant S2 and battlefield information control center (BICC) in the 1st Battalion, 37th Armor, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized); and Intelligence and Surveillance Platoon Leader, 107th Military Intelligence Battalion, 7th Infantry Division (Light). CPT Webber has attended the Air Defense Artillery Officer Advanced Course, the Counterintelligence Officer Course, and the Combined Arms and Services Staff School. Readers can contact him via E-mail at g2ace04@hq.c5.army.mil.

MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

The Military Intelligence Corps accepts nominations throughout the year for the MI Hall of Fame (HOF). Commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, or civilians who have served in a U.S. Army intelligence unit or in an intelligence position with the U.S. Army are eligible for nomination. A nominee must have made a significant contribution to MI that reflects favorably on the MI Corps.

Fort Huachuca provides information on nomination procedures. If you wish to nominate someone, contact Mr. Jim Chambers, ATTN: ATZS-CDR (Hall of Fame), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000, call commercial (520) 533-1178, DSN 821-1178, or via E-mail at chambersj@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

So You're The BICC?

by First Lieutenant
Michael C. Nienhaus

"Welcome Lieutenant, you're our new BICC, and by the way we are heading off to CMTC in about a month." This phrase is a common welcome to many MI officers newly assigned to the European Theater. You may have been a platoon leader or executive officer in your previous job, but now you are the BICC (battalion intelligence collection coordinator). You may soon discover you are no longer even a lieutenant.

The goal of this article is to give some guidance in being a BICC heading off to the Combined Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). You are going to make your share of mistakes despite this guidance. Hopefully, it will save you some unnecessary grief.

Guidance to New BICCs

If you are still in the basic course, pay attention. What you learn in the MI Officer Basic Course actually applies to being a BICC. If you memorize intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) early, it will save your time because you will otherwise memorize it later.

Do not assume you will have an experienced 96B (Intelligence Analyst) to support you in learning your job. A severe shortage of MI noncommissioned officers has left combat arms battalions thin. Be ready not only to do your job, but one or two others as well. Your battalion will likely give you a "replacement" from a military occupational specialty (MOS) in which they have overage. Remember though, it is any MOS.

Visit the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at Hohenfels, Germany. Your battalion or brigade gunnery rotations at Grafenwoehr are an ideal time to visit the CALL building. Failing to do this is a mistake I saw many battalion and even brigade S2s make—they did not schedule an appointment. Many thought they could make one "when they had a chance." There always seems to be a more important reason for not going or for cutting the visit short. Schedule at least two months in advance and allow a minimum of two full days for the visit.

I firmly believe that if you fail to study the battles on the Home Station Workstation, you are hurting your battalion. The opposing force (OPFOR) has standard routes, observation locations, and rates of march, which you can easily see.

When you are at CMTC, schedule a right-seat ride with the OPFOR, but remember not to believe everything they tell you. I found some of the information they provided was "misleading." That is "operations security" (OPSEC) for them.

Know your equipment and how to fix it. If the radio goes down in the middle of the battle, your executive officer will not accept an excuse. Be able to fix your vehicle and any communications equipment you have. At the very least, be able to explain the problem intelligently to the person sent to help you. One of the S2s for whom I worked had me spend every Monday in the motor pool working on our "track." I never appreciated this until we deployed.

What is the best way to do your job? The truth is: the way your S2 wants you to do it. Both of the two S2s I worked for during CMTC rotations were completely different. Even if you think you could give Rommel lessons in tank tactics (if the old Field Marshall had only listened to his MI lieutenants!), your mission in life is to make your S2's life easier. This can be anything from keeping the brigade S2 at bay to developing the entire reconnaissance plan while the "2" catches a few hours of needed sleep.

Remember that your S2 is not only responsible for all the intelligence products, but also attends the briefings, rehearsals, and the painful after-action reviews while you get a short break. Just as you cannot point to one of your soldiers when you run out of fuel in the middle of a road march, so the captain cannot explain to the colonel that the Enemy Situational Template is wrong because the BICC did not follow his instructions. S2s are responsible for every right or wrong thing done in the intelligence section—do not ever let them down.

The stress, lack of sleep, cold, dust, and mud of CMTC will push you to your limits. **Never take this out on your soldiers.** Know your limits, take a five-minute break, and then go back to work.

Your evaluators will give you suggestions in how to improve your performance. **Listen to them,** take notes (for future operations), but limit your changes. Set a general rule of three changes a day. Much more than that and it can overburden

(continued on page 53)

Understanding the National CI Community

by Major William J. Morris and Major Regan K. Smith (USA, Retired)

There is no one "czar" for counterintelligence (CI) within the United States—deliberately. This arrangement protects our citizens' individual rights while still allowing agencies to execute CI functions independently. This article introduces the myriad CI organizations within the U.S. Government.

It is nearly impossible to graphically display all the interrelationships among all national CI community players graphically. Figure 1 depicts, to some degree, the hierarchical command and control relationships of the organizations to which the various CI community members belong. In reality, the success of the CI community derives from the voluntary cooperation among its members.

While all the CI community members ultimately fall under organizations in the Executive Branch, the Congress provides checks and balances on all U.S. CI activities. Both the House Permanent Select Com-

mittee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) provide congressional oversight.

Editor's Note: The expansions of all the acronyms in the text and figures in this and the following article are in the glossary on page 36.

National-Level CI

At the national, non-Department of Defense (DOD) level, several entities have a counterintelligence charter. The Federal Bureau of Investigation coordinates CI issues in the United States. Interestingly, the FBI's parent organization, the Department of Justice, is not a formal member of the CI community. This gives law enforcement the independence it needs while preserving intelligence oversight. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has the coordination charter for CI overseas. Other national-level agencies involved in CI include the Department of Energy and the Department of State.

The National Counterintelligence Center comprises representatives from all of the different U.S. CI entities. The NACIC does not direct CI operations or investigations, nor does it task CI assets; rather it deconflicts CI operations and production and refers common policy issues to the National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NACIPB). Although it is located at the CIA and coordinates with the Director of Central Intelligence's Community Management Staff, it works under the auspices of the NACIPB; NACIPB in turn answers to the National Security Council which supports the President.

CI at DOD and Our Sister Services

At DOD, the Director of Counterintelligence is under the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security and Information Operations in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (OASD C3I). The Director of CI does not direct CI operations or investigations. The Director, however, does control the funds in the Foreign Counterintelligence Program budget, coordinates and writes CI policy for DOD, and exercises oversight of the Defense Counterintelligence Information System (DCIIS) program (see the related article, "Army Counterintelligence and the Impact of the Defense Counterintelligence Information System" on page 37).

Other DOD agencies with CI involvement include the—

- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
- National Security Agency (NSA).
- Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).
- National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).
- Defense Security Service (DSS).




Figure 1. The U.S. Counterintelligence Community.

DIA's Joint Counterintelligence Support Branch (JCISB) advises the Joint Staff on CI matters and writes joint CI tactics, techniques, procedures, and policy. JCISB also deconflicts national-level CI collection requirements among the Services.

All unified and specified command CINCs (commanders in chief) have CI officers on staff to advise them on the ongoing CI activities in their areas of responsibility (AORs). When standing up a Joint Task Force (JTF), the CINC appoints a J2X to oversee JTF CI and human intelligence (HUMINT) activities. The element under the J2X responsible for coordinating Service CI activities in the JTF AOR is the Task Force CI Coordinating Authority (TFCICA).

By law, each Service is entirely responsible for its own CI program. The Air Force and the Navy CI programs exist in "stovepipe" organizations; they conduct their CI activities in conjunction with their law enforcement missions. Air Force CI is part of the Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), which is itself part of the Air Force's Office of the Inspector General. Navy CI functions reside in the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. The NCIS primarily performs the Marines' strategic CI functions while the Corps' CI elements concentrate on tactical and operational CI.

Army CI

Unlike the other Services, the Army has a decentralized CI structure that is separate and distinct from its law enforcement community. The Army conducts CI missions across the tactical, operational, and strategic echelons. Army CI assets at echelons above corps (EAC) focus on strategic and operational CI missions. With the exception of the 650th MI Group, which responds to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Unit	Location	Elements	Comments
EAC CI and HUMINT 66th MI Group 500th MI Group, B Co, 205th MI Battalion 500th MI Group, B Co, MI Battalion (Prov) 501st MI Brigade, 524th MI Battalion 513th MI Brigade, 202d MI Battalion 650th MI Group 902d MI Group	Augsburg, Germany Fort Shafter, HI Camp Zama, Japan Yongsan, Korea Fort Gordon, GA SHAPE, Belgium Fort Meade, MD		
Tactical Exploitation Battalions 14th TEB 163d TEB 165th TEB 221st TEB 250th TEB 519th TEB	Fort Lewis, WA Fort Hood, TX Darmstadt, Germany Fort Gillem, GA San Rafael, CA Fort Bragg, NC	12 CI Teams, 12 HUMINT Teams 12 CI Teams, 12 HUMINT Teams 12 CI Teams, no HUMINT Teams GA ARNG CA ARNG 16 CI Teams, 16 HUMINT Teams	Inact: 15 Sep 97 Inact: 15 Sep 97 Act: 1 Sep 98 Act: 1 Sep 99
Divisional CI/HUMINT 1st Armor Division (Mechanized) 1st Cavalry Division 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) 2d Infantry Division 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) 10th Mountain Division (Light) 25th Infantry Division (Light) 82d Airborne Division 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)	Dexheim, Germany Fort Hood, TX Wuerzburg, Germany Camp Essayons, Korea Fort Stewart, Georgia Fort Hood, TX Fort Drum, NY Schofield Barracks, HI Fort Bragg, NC Fort Campbell, KY	3 CI Teams, 3 HUMINT Teams 3 CI Teams, 3 HUMINT Teams 3 CI Teams, 3 HUMINT Teams 3 CI Teams, 3 HUMINT Teams 3 CI Teams, 3 HUMINT Teams 3 CI Teams, 3 HUMINT Teams 4 CI Teams, 4 HUMINT Teams 3 CI Teams, 3 HUMINT Teams 4 CI Teams, 4 HUMINT Teams 4 CI Teams, 4 HUMINT Teams	

Figure 2. Army Counterintelligence Assets at EAC and ECB.

(SACEUR), Army EAC CI assets are aligned under the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). Army CI assets at echelons corps and below (ECB) are in the corps MI brigades' tactical exploitation battalions (TEBs) (at V Corps and XVIIIth Airborne Corps, only), and in the divisional MI battalions (see Figure 2). I Corps and III Corps currently have no organic corps-level CI assets since the 14th and 163d TEBs inactivated. The California and Georgia Army National Guard are now forming TEBs to help offset this loss.

One Community

What Figure 1 cannot depict is the routine coordination that takes place laterally between CI community members. For example, the CI and Human Intelligence Directorate under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) at Headquarters, Department of the Army, coordinates almost daily with the FBI, CIA, OASD C3I and the Director of CI, DSS, DIA and JCISB, the NACIC, NCIS, AFOSI, and subordinate Army CI elements.

Ultimately, CI succeeds due to the efforts of, and the cooperation

among, the CI professionals in each organization. Our CI organizations can work together while retaining the necessary independence of action and protection of their sources—truly a CI community.*

At the time he wrote this article, Major Jeff Morris was the Executive Officer to the Director of Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence, Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT). Commissioned as an Armor officer, he branch-transferred into Military Intelligence. Major Morris has served in a variety of counterintelligence and HUMINT operational command and staff assignments both in the continental United States and overseas. He is currently an Observer/Controller with the 87th Division (Training Support) in Birmingham, Alabama. Readers may reach him via E-mail at jeff.morris@usarc-emh2.army.mil.

Major Regan Smith (USAR, Retired) is the CI and intelligence-oversight policy proponent assigned to the Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Directorate, Army DCSINT. Major Smith has more than 23 years of military and civilian counterintelligence experience at all echelons. You can contact her via E-mail at regan.smith@hqda.army.mil.

Counterintelligence-Related Glossary

ACE - Analysis and Control Element
ACIC - Army Counterintelligence Center (pronounced A-sic)
Act. - Activated
AFOSI - U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations
ARFOR - U.S. Army Forces
ARNG - U.S. Army National Guard
ASAS - All-Source Analysis System
ASD - Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD C3I - Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
Bde - Brigade
Bn - Battalion
BPR - Business Process Review
C3I - Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
CA - California
CFSO - Counterintelligence Force-Protection Source Operations (pronounced CIF-so)
CHATS - CI/HUMINT (Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence) Automated Tool Set
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
CINCS - Commanders in Chief
CISOs - Counterintelligence staff officers (CISO) (pronounced C-sos)
CMS - Community Management Staff (under the DCI)
CO - Company
DASD - Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DCI - Director of Central Intelligence
DCIIS - Defense Counterintelligence Information System (pronounced D-sys)
DCSINT - Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
DCIRP - Defense Counterintelligence Requirements Panel (pronounced D-surp)
DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency

Dir. - Director
DOD - Department of Defense
DODIIS - Department of Defense Intelligence Information System
DOE - Department of Energy
DOJ - Department of Justice
DOS - Department of State
DSNET - Defense Secure Network
DSS - Defense Security Service
DTRA - Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EAC - Echelons above corps
ECB - Echelons corps and below
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCIP - Foreign Counterintelligence Program (pronounced FI-sip)
FORSKOM - U.S. Army Forces Command
GA - Georgia
GP - Group
HPSCI - House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (pronounced HIP-see)
HUMINT - Human intelligence (HU on Figure 3 in the second article)
HQDA - Headquarters, Department of Army
Inact. - Inactivated
INSCOM - U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
INTELINK - Intelligence Link
ITRT - Individual Tactical Reporting Tool
JAC - Joint Analysis Center
JCISB - Joint Counterintelligence Support Branch
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIC - Joint Intelligence Center
JTFs - Joint Task Forces
MDITDS - Migration Defense Intelligence Threat Data System (pronounced M-dits)
NACIC - National Counterintelligence Center (pronounced NAY-sic)

NACIPB - National Counterintelligence Policy Board
NSC - National Security Council
OASD C3I - Office of the Assistance Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
OPS - Operations
OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense
PM - Program Manager
PROV - Provisional
RWS - Remote Workstation
S&IO - Security and Information Operation
SCI - Sensitive compartmented intelligence
SHAPE - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIPRNET - Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
SS - Single source
SSCI - Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (pronounced Sissy)
STU-III - Secure Telephone Unit—Third Generation
TEB - Tactical Exploitation Battalion
TFCICA - Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Agency (pronounced tif-KICK-uh)
TIARA - Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (pronounced t-AIR-uh)
Tm - Team
TRADOC - U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TSCM - Technical surveillance countermeasures
TSM ASAS - TRADOC System Manager for ASAS (pronounced TIS-em)
USAF - U.S. Air Force
USAR - U.S. Army Reserve
USMC - U.S. Marine Corps
WS - Workstation

Note: These acronyms appear in the articles entitled "Understanding the National CI Community" and "Army CI and the Impact of the Defense Counterintelligence Information System."

Army Counterintelligence and the Impact of the Defense Counterintelligence Information System

by Major William J. Morris

This year, the Army plans to begin fielding the Defense Counterintelligence Information System (DCIIS) (pronounced D-sys). The significance of this event lies not so much in the fielding of a new system as it does in the resulting revolutionary changes that will occur in the way the Defense counterintelligence (CI) community does business.

Definitions and Functions

As defined by the Army, CI is—*Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, persons, or international terrorist activities.*¹

To fully understand what CI does, one must consider its four functions—

- Operations.
- Investigations.
- Collection.
- Analysis and production.

We design CI operations to thwart foreign intelligence services. CI investigations establish the elements of proof for prosecution or administrative actions, and may provide the basis for CI operations or for additional actions to neutralize threats.

While investigations and operations have a more strategic focus, CI collection cuts across all ech-

elons and, at the tactical and operational levels, includes CI force-protection source operations. CFSOs take place outside the United States in response to local command requirements and use sources to provide information in support of force protection. (It is an important distinction that, while CI supports force protection and information operations, CI by itself does not equate to force protection or information operations.) Other examples of CI collection operations might include liaison, debriefings, and interviews.

Finally, CI analysis and production also occurs at all echelons. At the strategic end, the Army Counterintelligence Center (ACIC) performs this function. At the tactical and operational levels, the analysis and control element (ACE) ex-

ecutes analysis and production. As demonstrated, all four functions of CI occur across all echelons, from tactical to strategic (see Figure 1).

Improving CI Processes and the Need for DCIIS

The Issue. In the United States, we do not centralize CI functions under any one governmental entity. A plethora of organizations, both within and outside the DOD conduct CI activities (see the previous article). Not only is this deliberate, it is appropriate for a representative democracy. The potential for the abuse of centralized CI entities is clear when one remembers Adolph Hitler's GESTAPO, the former Soviets' KGB, and the STASSI in East Germany.² However, this decentralized system of U.S. CI activities makes for disparate procedures among CI organizations, builds inefficiencies into the system, and makes information sharing among the myriad CI entities difficult. Thus, the need for standardizing and automating certain CI processes became clear.

The Genesis of DCIIS. In 1992, the OASD C3I (Office of the Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and In-




Figure 1. Involvement of Various Echelons in the CI Functions.

Counterintelligence-Related Glossary

ACE - Analysis and Control Element	Dir. - Director	NACIPB - National Counterintelligence Policy Board
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Act. - Activated	DODIIS - Department of Defense Intelligence Information System	OASD C3I - Office of the Assistance Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
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


Figure 1. Involvement of Various Echelons in the CI Functions.

telligence) conducted an extensive review of DOD CI. The committee, comprised of Service representatives, conducted a Business Process Review (BPR) full time from 1992 through 1995 to standardize the process that the DOD CI entities used to perform their assigned duties. It became clear that DOD CI should automate certain processes. However, automating the CI procedures extant at the time would only cause the CI organizations to become more efficient at their inefficiencies. The BPR revealed that the process of how DOD CI addressed its four functions must become more efficient and, only then, should DOD automate those improved processes.

Development Of DCIIS. The ASD C3I approved the BPR committee's recommendations and chartered the Defense Counterintelligence Requirements Panel (DCIRP). CI representatives from each Service and select agencies—the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Defense Security Service (DSS), and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)—comprise the DCIRP. The committee chair rotates among the Services. The DCIRP assists in DCIIS development and implementation by coordinating Service CI practices and policies to ensure DCIIS interoperability; it also identifies new functional CI requirements. The OASD C3I also established a DCIIS Program Manager position under the Director of Counterintelligence. The DCIIS PM directs the system's development and implementation.

The Defense CI Information System

DCIIS operates in a client-server environment that automates the four functions of CI and facilitates information sharing (see Figure 2). It uses the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) to

pass information. DCIIS will operate, at least initially, at the SECRET level; eventually, DCIIS will also be available for sensitive compartmented information (SCI) use.

The DCIIS servers form the heart of the system. They enable users to post or draw information from one of the four CI functional areas on that server. The CI operations and investigations modules reside in proprietary areas on the servers and each Service or agency will determine what information regarding those two functions it will share with the other system users. Both the CI collection module and the CI analysis and production module reside in the server's shared portion. In all cases, electronic locks and keys and the use of digital certificates will control access to the information.

The DCIIS servers are the only hardware associated with the system. Users will access the DCIIS functionality by "pointing" their SIPRNET browsers to the DCIIS site (for example, in a garrison environment). Deployed personnel

will use their laptop computers' Internet browsers to access the DCIIS server through a Secure Telephone Unit—Third Generation (STU-III).

No single central DCIIS database contains all of the information resident in DCIIS. However, users will be able to search all of the servers to find out if information exists. Again, however, a user must have the proper digital certificates and permissions to retrieve information. DCIIS servers will eventually reside at the Service CI headquarters, at the theater level with the unified and specified commands, and with the mobile servers that will deploy as necessary with the joint task forces.

Developing the Strategic CI Automated System

CI, as an intelligence discipline, does not exist in a vacuum; neither should a CI automation solution exist in a void. The early focus of the BPR and subsequently the DCIRP was on the improvement of the CI functions at the strategic level. To that end, OASD C3I se-




Figure 2. The Defense Counterintelligence Information System.

lected the Migration Defense Intelligence Threat Data System (MDITDS) to serve as the pathway for DCIIS development and implementation.

MDITDS is a DIA-managed system of systems. In addition to the DCIIS counterintelligence functionality, other MDITDS subsystems address counterterrorism as well as indications and warning. With appropriate digital certificates, non-CI users of MDITDS will be able to access the shared portion of DCIIS (both the collection and the analysis and production modules).

While MDITDS may be an efficient method for passing information among members of the strategic DOD CI community, it lacks applicability at the operational and tactical echelons. For that reason, DCIIS must also work in conjunction with the systems that provide the common picture of the battlespace to the deployed commander. For the Army, that system is the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS).

Army CI/HUMINT Automation Development³

Army HUMINT has an inextricable link to CI at the tactical and operational levels, especially as they support the force protection mission. While this article concentrates on CI, Army HUMINT will also use and benefit from these modernization efforts.

To ensure DCIIS utility at the tactical and operational levels, the system will soon include tactical CI and HUMINT forms. Users will be able to complete these forms on either the DCIIS server or by using the CI subsystem of ASAS and then forwarding them to a DCIIS server. Soon, most of the necessary tactical forms will also be integral to the CI/HUMINT subsystem of ASAS to allow a collector to send them to an ASAS Remote Workstation (RWS).




Figure 3. The ASAS CI/HUMINT Subsystem.

The CI/HUMINT subsystem of ASAS consists of four parts (see Figure 3). A handheld data entry and retrieval device called the Individual Tactical Reporting Tool (ITRT) is under development for use by the CI agent or HUMINT collector (interrogator). At the team level, the CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS) is already in the field being used to facilitate CI communications and reporting. At the higher headquarters level, a planned CI/HUMINT operations workstation will facilitate command and control (C²) and reporting of CI and HUMINT information; the ASAS Light will likely provide the basis for this workstation. The final portion of the ASAS CI/HUMINT subsystem is the CI/HUMINT Single-Source Workstation. Analysts will use the Single-Source Workstation to assist them in contributing CI and HUMINT information to fused SCI intelligence products.

Many organizations play a role in the Army's CI/HUMINT modernization program. The U. S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager (TSM) for ASAS oversees the defi-

nition of system requirements and monitors system development to ensure the satisfaction of those requirements. The TSM works in conjunction with the Army Deputy Chief Of Staff for Operations, Force Development, Intelligence Systems Directorate (DAMO-FDI). DAMO-FDI controls the program funding (as it applies to Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) funding) and exercises oversight of system development with an eye toward the integration of the system with other intelligence systems. The CI/HUMINT Product Office, under the Program Manager (PM)—Intelligence Fusion, is responsible for development and production of the systems themselves. Finally, the Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Directorate (DAMI-CH) of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT), Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) acts as a facilitator for all organizations involved, providing functional expertise and general program oversight and guidance.

Impacts

The disparate Service and DOD CI elements will soon—for the first



Figure 4. CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS).

time—have the capability to submit, retrieve, and share information electronically in a secure environment using standardized formats and procedures. While each Service will continue to perform its own CI functions, they can share the resulting information in a dramatically more efficient manner. CI collectors can now pass information practically instantaneously from almost any location in the world to the analyst, consumer, or another collector.

The challenge produced by this new technology is one of policy. Just because we have the capability to send information from the foxhole to the Pentagon, is it prudent to do so? What quality control measures must we put in place to ensure that raw information does not reach decision-makers without some sort of fused analysis? Conversely, how do we ensure that we do not needlessly delay time-sensitive information critical to force protection in a self-induced bureau-

cratic morass? The answers to these questions lie in the development of rational tactics, techniques, procedures, and policies and, ultimately, in listening to and trusting the best judgment of our CI experts.*

Endnotes

1. FM 34-60, Counterintelligence, dated 3 October 1995.

2. Expansions of these acronyms are—

GESTAPO is *Geheimstaatspolizei* (Secret Security Service).

KGB is the former Soviets' *Komitet Gossudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (Committee for State Security Soviet).

STASI is *Staatssicherheitsdienst* (State Security Service).

3. Note: The modernization of technical CI systems such as polygraphs and technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) equipment is beyond the scope of this article.

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Intelligence Must Drive Operations: How Intelligence Can Clear

The Fog of War

by Lieutenant Colonel
Michael T. Flynn

Solid S2 section standing operating procedures (SOPs) form the basis for successful intelligence operations. Successful brigade and battalion S2s observed at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) base their SOPs on current doctrine. As important as content, however, is soldier familiarity with the SOPs; many times units arrive with excellent SOPs that they neither know nor use.

Experience shows that effective S2 SOPs cover six areas:

- Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
- Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning.
- Staff integration and synchronization.
- S2 section operations.
- Asset integration with emphasis on intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) assets.
- Intelligence support to the targeting process.

While units will address each of these areas in different ways, the following pages contain thoughts on each, based on current and emerging doctrine and successful TTP (tactics, techniques, and procedures) observed at the JRTC.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

The IPB process can be time consuming. The S2 should complete many of the doctrinal products at the home station, as part of the

"homework" phase of IPB. Terrain analysis products, order of battle (OB) laydowns, and opposing force (OPFOR) doctrinal templates should ready well before deploying. Successful S2s prepare these products in advance, and are thoroughly familiar with them before beginning the orders process at the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB), or at the home station for units conducting an airborne insertion. Unfortunately, the S2s often will overlook these products. Too often at JRTC, observer/controllers (O/Cs) find well-prepared products rolled up in the corner of a tactical operations center (TOC) or buried in the back of a vehicle. With minimal updating, these products have proven extremely useful. During the abbreviated planning process, when time is especially limited, these pre-produced IPB products become critical.

Step One, Defining the Battlefield Environment, includes a number of sub-tasks. However, the critical first step is for the battle staff to determine the area of interest (AI) of the Task Force (TF). There are no firm guidelines for choosing an AI. Instead, the staff relies heavily on their judgment and experience and on a sound analysis of time and space factors for both friendly and enemy units to determine the AI. In briefing the initial intelligence estimate during mission analysis, the S2 must present the AI and its characteristics, and explain why it is of value.

In **Step Two, Describing the Battlefield's Effects**, the S2 must avoid the common mistake of overloading the commander and staff with large amounts of data about the battlefield, without describing how the battlefield will affect and shape the fight. When done well, this step of the IPB process paints a clear picture for the commander and staff of the opportunities and limitations that the environment presents to any force operating within the AI. The S2 discusses these effects primarily through the modified combined obstacles overlay (MCOO), and consideration of the OCOKA (observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach) factors.

Many unit TTP pamphlets still say the S2 should identify at least three enemy COAs, experience shows that this is impractical

During **Step Three, Evaluating the Threat**, S2s must be thorough. They must depict the enemy as they see it for their commanders and staff. The S2 should first discuss the enemy's composition without regard for weather and terrain.

The S2s then identify their best estimates of the forces available to the enemy, their current personnel resourcing and equipment levels, and their organization. The S2 normally uses line-and-block charts annotated with figures showing the enemy's current strength and the quantity, types, and capabilities of enemy weapons systems to illustrate these points.

In this stage of the IPB process, many S2s err by presenting too much information. The S2 should limit description to those forces and weapon systems likely to influence the unit's fight. For example, if the unit must conduct airborne or air assault force-entry operations, enemy air defense systems become high-payoff targets (HPTs). If you are in the midst of conducting search and attack operations, enemy mortars may be critical.

Step Three of IPB can be long and detailed, and may tax the staff's patience. During this portion of the briefing, the S2 briefs the entire staff. After itemizing the enemy's forces and weapons systems without unnecessary facts, the S2 translates this into enemy strengths and weaknesses. This analysis should address each enemy battlefield operating system (BOS) and show the results graphically; these charts should highlight those threat capabilities that pose dangers to friendly forces, and the enemy weaknesses that we can exploit.

In **Step Four, Determining Threat Courses of Action (COAs)**, the S2 must always present the estimated most probable course of action, and the most dangerous COA. The S2 derives these projections from the current Situation Template and Event Template. Several techniques for presenting these COAs are successful at the JRTC, including cartoon sketches, map enlargements, and terrain models that allow the entire

staff to view the COA at one time.

Regardless of presentation technique, the entire staff and subordinate commanders must walk away from this portion of the S2's brief with a clear understanding of how the S2 thinks the enemy will fight. As a brigade S2, you need to speak at a level of detail that would be of interest to company commanders.

Although many unit TTP pamphlets still say the S2 should identify at least three enemy COAs for the staff, experience shows that

new information must be current. Close battle tracking of new information, combined with the S2's understanding of threat doctrine and capabilities, should result in predictive intelligence. Too often, S2s are not able to produce this predictive intelligence for a number of reasons. Perhaps they have not mastered their opponent's OB and tactics, or their sections are not accurately tracking the current battle, thus depriving the S2 of valuable input into his threat model. Sometimes S2s "lose the bubble" by giving in to a tendency to let down after

- Is the R&S plan based on approved priority intelligence requirements?
- Is the R&S plan based on war-gamed enemy courses of action (COAs)?
- Have you developed indicators to help satisfy the commander's PIR?
- Have you tasked units in an operations order or fragmentary order to collect information?
- Do tasked units understand they are collecting information for the S2?
- Is there a system in place to track the results of the R&S plan?
- Are units reporting as required (e.g., are they meeting the reporting timelines as directed by the S3 or S2)?
- Do you have a system for debriefing collection assets? Does the SOP require all collectors to provide feedback to the S2 upon completion of their missions?
- Has the S3 included R&S taskings in paragraph three of the order, under Tasks to Subordinate Units, or buried them in an appendix or annex?
- Have you briefed the commander on the R&S plan and received approval for it?
- Are you maximizing all available assets to conduct R&S?
- Has the S2 coordinated the R&S plan with adjacent units?

Figure 1. R&S Plans That Answer These Questions Set the Stage for R&S Success.

this is impractical, given the time constraints facing battalion and brigade staffs. Instead, S2s must determine and present the most probable and most dangerous COAs, and then be ready to present likely enemy branches to these COAs, if time permits. Do not think it is over at this point: the IPB process, as stated earlier, is a continuous one. Analysis of

preparation and briefing of the order. In any case, the S2 must stay ahead of both the enemy and the other staff members, and anticipate the enemy's next action, rather than reacting to his last. An S2 who must constantly react to enemy actions has, in the final analysis, failed.

R&S Planning

R&S remains a weak point throughout the force. Failures are

- Journal Maintenance
- Request for Intelligence Information Log
- Intelligence Summary Log
- Database Management
- Information Flow
- Communications
- Battle Damage Assessment Tracking
- Analysis

Figure 2. Basic But Essential Section Tasks.

usually from one of two root causes; either units do not follow their SOPs for R&S or commanders do not demand that R&S missions be as carefully planned as other combat missions. Those commanders who have planned and executed R&S missions with the same level of detail as they did any other combat operation have achieved great success at the JRTC. However, in the majority of cases, R&S operations too often lack full consideration in the planning process and the results have been disappointing. As an S2, if your R&S plan meets the following requirements, you have set the stage for a successful R&S effort (see Figure 1).

Staff Integration and Synchronization

Currently, staff integration and synchronization of the battlefield operating systems (BOSs) does not work well. Successful S2s have aggressively tapped into the "system of systems" that a battalion or brigade TF brings to the fight. The majority of S2s overlook expertise available inside their own TOCs. The best available source on threat BOS capabilities is usually the staff BOS representatives who can give the best advice on threat BOS capabilities. S2s must actively seek out input from other BOS representatives, and help them become familiar with the systems subordinate units bring to the battle.

S2 Section Operations

S2 section operations function

through solid SOPs and staff battle drills. The goal when assessing your section's operations is to measure the ability of your section to conduct its essential tasks smoothly, without requiring so much leader input

and supervision that those leaders become distracted from the planning process. Listed in Figure 2 are several tasks that fall under the general heading of section operations. As you perform your self-assessment to begin planning your section's training program, ask how well your section can perform these basic, but essential, tasks.

The SOP should furnish the foundation for how you and your personnel operate, especially when fatigue sets in and the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) increases. Another idea is to create "smart cards," checklists of the critical functions your section performs. They are similar to a battle drill, but literally provide a soldier with a step-by-step list of what to do in certain situations. You must review your section operations together as a section and survey your junior enlisted soldiers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Many times, we find soldiers with great ideas; however, either no one is soliciting their help or no one is listening.

Asset Integration and Usage

Integrating collection assets into your TF's intelligence operations is a tough job made all the more difficult by one common shortcoming—S2s typically do not understand the capabilities of these collection systems, or how they are best employed. For these MI collection systems, a whole crew of experts is only a telephone call away. S2s should talk to their supporting MI

companies and battalions about the systems they bring to the field. MI battalions and brigades also have experts on many of the national systems. While arranging for this valuable training, do not forget to bring the S3 and Fire Support Officer to give them an appreciation for what these systems can and, just as importantly, cannot do.

To be successful, an S2 must also understand the capabilities of the important collection assets that do not come from the military intelligence side of the house. While they will probably never thoroughly understand all these systems, S2s must know the essential planning considerations for each so they can fully integrate them into the TF's collection effort.

Intelligence Support to the Targeting Process

Intelligence support to targeting provides the focus the staff needs to bring all fires, both lethal and nonlethal, to bear against the commander's HPTs. This support begins in the initial steps of the IPB process, where the S2 identifies threat strengths and weaknesses, and derives preliminary enemy high-value targets (HVTs) while developing the Situation and Event Templates.

Additionally, the S2 must prepare for the formal meetings with a specific set of information; Figure 3 lists some important considerations for an S2 in preparing for, and participating in, targeting and synchronization meetings. One could use a variety of tools; however, the suggestion here is to have an agenda to make the meeting efficient and productive.

Conclusion

Successful commanders and their S2s training at the JRTC understand the central role intelligence plays in their units' (continued on page 51)

CONCEPTS

Battle Command Battle Lab (Huachuca)

by Master Sergeant
Robert P. Lopez

The purpose of this article is to solicit good ideas from you, the Army's Military Intelligence community; the Battle Command Battle Lab at Fort Huachuca (BCBL-Huachuca) will incorporate them as it introduces new technology, doctrine, and tactics into the Army. The mission of the Battle Lab is to—

- Plan, conduct, and report the results of intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) and command and control warfare (C²W) experiments.
- Make recommendations concerning the results of these experiments.
- Facilitate the integration of successful experiment results into our Army's doctrine and TTP (tactics, techniques, and procedures).

Many of the best experiments and changes to our Army come from innovative soldiers in the field.

The Only Constant Is Change

Days after breaking out of the beach head at Normandy on D-Day in World War II, the U.S. Army was fighting a tenacious German force through century-old rows of hedges and vines used by farmers to corral and isolate their herds of cows and sheep. Over time, many of these hedges had grown to be as high and wide as a house. The only vehicle in the U.S. Army's inventory that could effectively punch through these hedgerows was the M4 Sherman tank equipped with a bulldozer blade. However, with only

four tanks so equipped per division, there simply were not enough on hand to rapidly clear the obstacles and dislodge the enemy. U.S. soldiers experimented with welding pipes or steel teeth onto the fronts of their Sherman tanks to improvise a quick solution to this daunting problem.

There is no approved solution to any tactical situation.

— General George S. Patton, Jr.¹

Lieutenant Charles Green, a tanker in the 29th Division, devised a bumper made from salvaged railroad tracks that the Germans had used as beach obstacles. The strength of the tracks permitted the Shermans to force their way through the thickest hedgerows. In the 2d Armored Division, a cab driver from Chicago, Sergeant Curtis Culin, designed and supervised the construction of a hedgerow-cutting device made from scrap iron pulled from a German roadblock. The blades gave the tank a resemblance to a rhinoceros, so Sherman tanks equipped with Culin's invention were "rhino tanks." These soldier-initiated modifications to an existing item of equipment in the Army inventory allowed the U.S. Army to quickly pierce the hedgerows and force a German withdrawal.

This innovation serves as a classic example of how soldiers can modify an item of existing equipment in a military force and incorporate it with new tactics to do much more than the designers of the equipment had originally intended. Soldiers improved their warfighting capability by using their experience, common sense, and

the equipment on hand to meet their immediate wartime needs. Soldiers' experience remains important today as new technology becomes available.

Use of New and Innovative Ideas

In a recent article published in *Soldiers Online*,² Gill High cites a statement with regard to modernization by General Eric K. Shinseki, the Army's new Chief of Staff, that the Army must make the most of allocated funds and be more creative in how it restructures and employs new technologies. The citation continued—

To be able to operate throughout the range of conflict, the force must be more versatile, agile, lethal and survivable. It must be able to get there more quickly and operate jointly. Right now, our heavy forces are too heavy and our light forces lack staying power. So we need to do some innovative thinking about structure, our modernization efforts, and spending.³

General Shinseki's recent directive to reconfigure two brigades at Fort Lewis, Washington, into mobile medium-weight brigades is an effort to fulfill this need.

Prejudice against innovation is a typical characteristic of an Officer Corps which has grown up in a well-tried and proven system.

— Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, *The Rommel Papers*, 1953⁴

A common misconception in a hierarchical community like the

Areas in Which We Are Seeking Your Input

- Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT)
- Information operations (IO)
- Counterintelligence/human intelligence (CI/HUMINT) of today
- Signals intelligence (SIGINT) of tomorrow

military services is that good ideas only come from the top down or from outside sources. No one person, organization, or company has a monopoly on good ideas. As the information revolution continues to change how the world conducts business, the Army is moving forward with the Force XXI effort at Fort Hood, Texas. The lessons learned from the digitization of this combat force are proving invaluable but the advances in information technology are moving so fast that the normal military research, development, and acquisition cycle cannot move fast enough. A baseline force equipped with "open architecture" technology will provide the Army with the framework from which it can incorporate emerging systems. How will the Army best use these new systems?

The automotive technology of Indy 500 race cars has improved every year since the beginning of the race back in 1909, yet no matter how fast, maneuverable, or well constructed the vehicles have become, drivers are still necessary. Great cars only win when great drivers drive them. The same analogy applies to technology, war, and soldiers. Technology will improve but commanders and soldiers will still remain the drivers.

The Concept Experimentation Program

Chapter 8-4 of **TRADOC** (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) **Pamphlet 71-9, Requirements Determination**, describes the Concept Experimentation Program. The CEP is a separately funded TRADOC program provid-

ing sponsors (TRADOC schools) with the ability to evaluate and capitalize on emerging technology, materiel initiatives, and warfighting ideas. It facilitates experimentation to determine the military utility and potential of an idea to become a DTLOMS (doctrine, training, leaders, organizations, materiel, and soldiers) solution to future operational capabilities.

The CEP provides funding and other resource support to conduct concept exploration and experimentation as a means to resolve DTLOMS issues and should focus on developing ideas in support of future operational capabilities (FOCs). FOCs are structured statements of operational capability required by the Army to achieve its future goals as stated in approval capstone and subordinate concepts. The CEP project development and approval process provides a mechanism to embrace new ideas and technological solutions. The CEP is a one-year program that consists of one submission cycle augmented by a quick reaction CEP identification and execution capability.

The Analysis and Control Team (ACT) enclave is an example of a successful CEP idea initiated, tested, and validated during the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment and ac-

quired through the Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP). The basic idea of mounting two All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) Remote Workstations (RWSs) on the back of a HMMWV (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle) complete with an organic networking infrastructure, enables the ACT enclave to exchange data. The data exchange is with all the Army Battle Command Systems (ABCSs) found in the brigade and with the Common Ground Station (CGS). This capability allows the ACT enclave to receive organic brigade, division, and echelons above division intelligence feeds that include various corps and echelons above corps (EAC) assets. The portability of the ACT enclave is ideal for the rapid deployment, set-up, and tear-down of a brigade ACT in a fast moving, fluid tactical scenario.

In the past five years, a number of systems have entered the MI inventory and our current MI soldiers are familiar with their true capabilities and major shortfalls. We are asking for your ideas and concepts for improving the Army's intelligence capabilities:

- What do you believe would work to improve the intelligence capability of your battalion, brigade, division, or corps?
- How could we better use systems currently in the MI inventory?
- Which current technological developments do you believe we could leverage into the current force structure as combat multipliers?

Submitting Your Ideas

- E-mail your idea to BCBLH@huachuca-emh1.army.mil
- Please include a basic description of your idea, a telephone number and E-mail address at which we can reach you, and your current assignment

The BCBL-Huachuca will review and evaluate all submitted ideas for their feasibility, cost, and value to the Army. By establishing an open conduit for the free exchange of ideas from the MI community at large, a number of innovative concepts will emerge. Individuals who submit ideas or concepts that warrant further examination and research will receive recognition for their efforts.

We must hold our minds alert and receptive to the application of unglimped methods and weapons. The next war will be won in the future, not in the past. We must go

on, or we will go under.

—General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 1931⁵

Endnotes

1. Peter G. Tsouras, *Warriors' Words, A Quotation Book* (London, United Kingdom: Arms and Armour Press, Strand, 1992).
2. Gill High, article in *Soldiers Online*, July 1999, at <http://www.dtic.mil/soldiers/jul1999/>.
3. Ibid.
4. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, *The Rommel Papers*, 1953.
5. Tsouras, *Warriors' Words, A Quotation Book*.

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DOCTRINE

Doctrinal Changes to HUMINT Collection on the Modern Battlefield

by Chief Warrant Officer Four Patrick J. Foxen (USA, Retired)

While human intelligence (HUMINT) is the acknowledged primary collection discipline in stability actions and support actions, we often relegate it to the back burner in conventional (offensive and defensive) operations. HUMINT is sometimes denigrated as unresponsive and too slow to produce usable results. Often, this is not due to the inability of the HUMINT collection teams—comprised of 351E, Human Intelligence Collection Technicians, and 97E, Human Intelligence Collectors—to obtain pertinent and timely information but rather their inadequate doctrinal employment that is at fault.

The doctrine for HUMINT collection teams in conventional operations must place the collector in timely contact with all types of human sources. This will eliminate unnecessary delays and redundancies and maximize these re-

sources, enabling them to produce timely and relevant intelligence in support of ongoing operations.

Inadequacies of Current Doctrine

Current doctrine and organizational structures place HUMINT collection teams at all echelons of an organization, under the premise that each echelon will conduct interrogations specifically to meet the requirements of that echelon. Current doctrine deals almost exclusively with enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and only peripherally mentions collection from other human sources in support of conventional operations. The furthest forward location for current doctrinal employment of the HUMINT collection teams is at the division forward EPW collecting point in the brigade support area. This system does not work for a number of reasons.

The excessive time involved in moving EPWs from the point of

capture to the division forward collection point (approximately eight hours) severely limits the impact that the information obtained from these EPWs will have on ongoing operations. Because of highly mobile offensive operations, by the time the interrogator speaks to the EPW, the lead elements of the brigade have already passed beyond the area for which the EPWs had actionable information.

Secondly, in the eight-hour interval between capture and interrogation, the EPW's initial shock and disorientation has dissipated, he has probably had an opportunity to sleep, and has eaten at least one meal. He recognizes that life as a U.S. prisoner of war is better than his existence before capture. While this is good, the EPW that arrives at the holding area is not the same person, psychologically, as the individual captured eight hours earlier. He has forgotten information, determined what information he

needs to conceal, and is less susceptible to interrogation techniques.

Interrogating the EPWs at each echelon usually results in only slight variations in the information collected and needless duplication of effort since higher echelon collection requirements usually become a part of the lower echelon's collection plan. This is a waste of our limited trained HUMINT collector capability.

Currently, the burden of the "immediate tactical questioning" falls on the combat unit S2s. However, they are not only extremely busy but are also not adequately trained for this mission.

The sterility of the Operation DESERT STORM battlefield was an anomaly. Most operations will take place in a HUMINT-rich environment and the local inhabitants are a valuable intelligence resource for the combat commander. Placing the interrogators at the EPW compounds and collection points limits the HUMINT collectors' sources of information to EPWs. The HUMINT collector's access to potential sources often expands by also placing them at refugee collection points and checkpoints. Even if they are at collection points and checkpoints, however, the HUMINT collectors are not in contact with the local inhabitants and civilians on the battlefield that the combat units encounter as they move forward.

Possible Solutions

There are two obvious solutions to this problem. We can move the EPWs and other HUMINT sources to the rear more rapidly or we can move the HUMINT collection teams to their potential HUMINT sources. I will examine each solution in turn.

Moving the Sources to the Collector. Can we move the

EPWs to collection points faster or can we move the other human sources to the collector? The answer is a definite "no."

The EPW evacuation system works about as efficiently as one can expect. The only major problem with the current EPW evacuation procedures is that they are not conducive to intelligence collection. While the communications revolution has tremendously increased the information flow, the time that it takes to move an EPW has not changed. The standard evacuation planning times are eight hours from the capturing unit to the brigade, 16 to 24 hours to the division holding area, and 24 to 72 hours to the corps facility. We can accelerate these transfer times in the short term, but with a high volume of EPWs, these times will slow.

Capturing units regard EPWs and civilians on the battlefield as impediments to ongoing operations. Doctrine requires capturing units to move EPWs to the rear expeditiously using organic transportation, preferably supply vehicles that would otherwise be returning to the rear empty. This requires valuable assets (soldiers and vehicles) from the capturing unit to escort the EPWs to the rear and assumes that these vehicles are not already in use transporting friendly wounded or to carry captured materiel. Units usually approach this problem in one of two ways.

In some cases, EPWs remain in place with minimum guards while the unit continues to advance. The EPWs will either stay in place until the rear elements catch up with them or will march toward the rear.

A second solution, used by many of the lead units in Operation DESERT STORM, was to disarm the EPW, give him a portable meal and a bottle of water, and point him in the direction of the rear. They told the EPWs to keep moving south

until they meet more U.S. forces.

Once EPWs arrive at the brigade holding area, the Military Police (MPs) take over the responsibility for guarding and further evacuating the EPWs. While the safeguarding of the prisoners is always paramount, their rapid evacuation is only a priority if they are in danger or when prisoners overcrowd the collection area. The MPs do a professional job of EPW handling but the HUMINT collection problem belongs to MI, not to the MPs.

The problem of moving civilians to central locations quickly is even more difficult. Civilians are as important a HUMINT source if not more so than EPWs on the modern battlefield. In general, soldiers bypass and ignore civilians on the battlefield. If we move them at all, we send civilians to refugee camps or collection points not collocated with EPW facilities. There is no formal methodology to move or consolidate civilians on the battlefield. Furthermore, even if we could accomplish the expedient movement of civilians and EPWs, we would still face the inefficiency of multi-echelon questioning, and the S2s' burden of tactical questioning.

Move the Collectors Closer to Their Sources. The second solution is to place the HUMINT collector in closer proximity to the point of EPW capture or where civilians are initially met. Since we cannot bring prisoners or locals to the interrogators in a timely fashion, the interrogators must go to them.

The current solution is to have mobile interrogation teams but this also has proven inadequate. The premise behind mobile interrogation teams is to have the teams located at the collection points. The teams are prepared to move forward when notified of the capture of an EPW. They usually only activate in the case of a high-level source we cannot evacuate to the

rear in a timely fashion. While it is quicker, in general, to move an interrogation team forward than it is to move EPWs to the rear, this usually results in the interrogation team chasing EPWs around the battlefield. Additionally, the teams require security for their movement and spend more time driving than they do questioning potential sources.

HUMINT collection teams need to move as far forward as possible as early as possible

The HUMINT collection teams need to be in direct support (DS) of forward units in anticipation of the capture of EPWs or encountering civilians rather than in response to events. This is significantly different than the mobile interrogation team solution mentioned earlier. The key to successful team deployment is to use the predictive analysis methodology inherent in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process to determine where the lead units are likely to encounter civilians and capture EPWs.

The HUMINT collection teams need to move as far forward as possible as early as possible to locations where the timely input of information from HUMINT sources is critical to mission accomplishment. They need to be in DS to the forward elements to meet their specific mission requirements. Between operational missions, the HUMINT collection teams would remain near the brigade tactical command post to ensure they can respond rapidly to future missions.

For example, suppose a brigade is in a *movement to contact* and its lead battalion is moving through a

region of small villages where contact with refugees and local inhabitants is likely. We anticipate that the refugees, in particular, may have valuable information concerning enemy locations and strength. IPB has also shown that U.S. forces are likely to encounter enemy reconnaissance elements and may be able to capture EPWs. The brigade should attach its HUMINT collector assets to the lead battalion, which can then deploy them forward to echelons as low as the headquarters elements of its lead companies. When they encounter civilians or capture EPWs, the HUMINT collector team will be able to question them immediately and pass the information on to the commander of the lead companies and the battalion S2, as appropriate. Upon a change of mission, the HUMINT collector team can move to the next anticipated "hot spot."

In another example, in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), the HUMINT collectors and interrogators should deploy to units as low as the company level, and in some cases, platoon level. When the unit makes a lodgment in a building, the HUMINT collection team should move in with the headquarters element and be available to interrogate prisoners, persuade holdouts to surrender, and help with the questioning and evacuation of non-combatants. They would be able to collect information on floor plans, defensive plans, locations of combatants and non-combatants in the building and surrounding neighborhood, and to pass that information directly to the individuals conducting the combat operation.

Detailed interrogation for items of long-term interest should only occur at the end of evacuation chain, not at intermediate locations. Depending on the size of the operation, this could be at theater, corps, or division level. MP doctrine as ex-

pressed in **FM 19-4, Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, and Enemy Prisoner of War Operations**, states—

When elements from the special-purpose MP escort guard companies are present in a theater of operations, elements from these units go as far forward as possible, to corps and even to division to accept accountability [of EPWs].

This parallels our proposed structure.

Possible Roadblocks Along the Way

There are four obvious questions we need to examine:

- What does this do to HUMINT collector survivability?
- Where do we get these HUMINT collector teams?
- How well does this system translate to stability and support operations requirements?
- How well does this proposal adapt itself to Force XXI operational concepts?

These are the areas which could prove barriers to implementing this new doctrine.

HUMINT Collector Survivability. The first question is what this does to the HUMINT collector's life expectancy on the battlefield. Commanders employing these collectors must realize that the collector is not a trained infantry soldier but a valuable, highly trained linguist and questioner and should operate accordingly. The bottom line, however, is mission accomplishment. If providing the commander with immediate tactical HUMINT entails risk to the collector, then that is part of doing business.

Obtaining the HUMINT Collector Teams. This second point deals with the required numbers of HUMINT collectors. This proposal seems to necessitate a vast in-

crease in the number of 351Es and 97Es in the force, but this is not necessarily the case. There are sufficient 351Es and 97Es in the system but we do not locate them in positions that maximize their collection opportunities. A sufficient number of HUMINT collector assets can come from the corps and division organic assets. As stated earlier, interrogation at corps, division, and even the brigade collection points is not timely enough to affect operations and is frequently redundant.

Interrogation and HUMINT collection are most efficient when done at only two locations: as close to the point of capture as possible and at the confinement facilities where the EPWs will spend the rest of the war. Likewise, it is best to question civilians on the battlefield as soon as U.S. forces encountered them and when they arrive at their final destinations such as refugee camps, and so forth. The purpose of initial questioning of both EPWs and civilians would be to collect information of immediate tactical concern while questioning at the "theater" level would be for information of operational and strategic concern. (We could directly evacuate sources of obvious strategic interest from the point where they undergo initial questioning to the "theater" camp.)

With this doctrinal change, employment of collectors currently assigned to corps and divisions would be in DS to the brigades. Echelons above corps (EAC) assets would remain unchanged. In the event that, due to the contingency size, a corps or even a division has the responsibility for setting up the "theater" camp, a slice from the EAC assets would augment them. The best organizational positioning of these elements would be at the EAC and at the divisions and separate brigades. The rationale for placing the assets at

the division would be to facilitate attaching them in DS to the component brigades based on the combat situation. For example, in *initial entry* operations, the lead brigade could have the entire division's HUMINT collection capability in direct support.

Although these changes will help optimize the use of scarce HUMINT resources, there will still never be as many collectors as there are opportunities for their employment. Commanders and S2s must continue to prioritize their usage as they do with any scarce resource.

Applicability to Stability and Support Operations. As to the third question, I believe that this doctrine will easily transition to stability and support operations. The brigade's HUMINT collection teams would provide point coverage within the brigade (or even a battalion task force) area of operation while the EAC assets would provide overall area coverage. However, it would be best in stability and support operations if the brigade teams came under Joint Task Force authority (J2X, G2X, etc.) which had more direct operational control over the brigade teams to assure a more coordinated effort and to deconflict source reporting.

Adaptability to Force XXI Doctrine. My work on the development of Force XXI doctrine indicates that this doctrinal change is long overdue. Current HUMINT doctrine for conventional operations moves at the same pace as that of units in World War II. The concept presented here is ideal in support of the "initial" brigade or "medium" division as part of a versatile, fast-moving force. The HUMINT collection capability forward deploys to provide immediate information that contributes to the ground force commanders' "picture" of the battlefield. We can easily transmit information collected forward to the brigade Analysis and Control Team

(ACT) or division Analysis and Control Element (ACE) for further analysis while providing the commander in direct contact with the enemy an immediate response to his intelligence requirements.

Conclusion

I strongly believe that placing HUMINT collection teams with the lead battalions and even lead companies where they initially encounter sources (to include EPWs and civilians) on the battlefield will make HUMINT collection and interrogation a more valuable resource. It will be better able to respond rapidly to the commander's operational needs. We must minimize unnecessary redundancy and maximize resources by eliminating interrogation and debriefing at intermediate points such as division and corps holding facilities, while continuing to meet long-term collection requirements at the theater EPW and refugee facilities.

Chief Warrant Officer Four Pat Foxen (USA, Retired) is a former Human Intelligence Collection Technician (351E) with more than 24 years of military experience. He is currently a contract doctrine writer at the Doctrine Division, Futures Directorate, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. Readers can contact him via E-mail at foxenp@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and by telephone at (520) 533-9966 or DSN 821-9966.

MI CORPS HALL OF FAME



Colonel Frank B. Rowlett
(Deceased)

Discipline: SIGINT

MI HOF Inductee: 1988

Cryptologic pioneer and inventor Colonel Frank Rowlett was the first cryptanalyst recruited by the War Department with the formation of the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) in 1930. He excelled in the cryptanalysis of machine ciphers and invented some of the most important cryptographic principles used in the cipher machine jointly developed by the U. S. Army and Navy prior to World War II.

From 1936 to the beginning of World War II, he was the cryptanalyst in charge of the U. S. Army group responsible for solving the Japanese diplomatic codes and ciphers. In 1939, he supervised the team of code-breakers who, after 18 months work, cracked Japan's highest-level diplomatic cipher system, the machine cipher called "Purple."

Solution of this extremely complicated Japanese cipher is one of the

greatest achievements in the annals of MI. The intelligence from "Purple" (known as "Magic") provided excellent information on Japanese plans during the years before the attack on Pearl Harbor. "Magic" revealed that war with Japan was imminent. Throughout the war, "Magic" continued to provide a unique look at the diplomatic background of Japanese strategy and plans.

"Magic" helped in the European Theater as well. Intercepting and analyzing messages from the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, the SIS provided Allied forces with a detailed description of German fortifications along the Normandy coast prior to D-Day. So valuable was this information to Allied invasion planning, General Dwight D. Eisenhower personally thanked the people who had produced the intelligence.

In World War II, Frank Rowlett directed one of the main cryptanalytical elements of the Army Security Agency (ASA). He served in the Army from 1942 to 1946, rising to the rank of Colonel.

After the war, he served as a senior civilian executive in the ASA. He played a significant role in shaping the future of U. S. cryptologic operations, including the unification of the three Service Cryptologic Agencies which led to the establishment of the Armed Forces Security Agency—later the National Security Agency (NSA).

He served four years at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a senior staff officer and cryptologic advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence. He returned to NSA in 1957, where he led the study group

involved in the founding of the National Cryptologic School; Frank Rowlett became its first commandant. As the agency's senior cryptologist, he served as Special Assistant to the Director, NSA, under four Directors until his retirement in 1965.



Kai Eduard Rasmussen
(Deceased)

Discipline: Linguist

MI HOF Inductee: 1988

Kai Eduard Rasmussen was born in Copenhagen, Denmark. Growing up during World War I, he found it difficult to break into a desirable profession because many of the developed countries with exception of the United States suffered from very high unemployment and opportunities were few. After reading that Henry Ford was paying the unheard sum of five dollars a day in wages, he immigrated to the United States in 1922.

After rejection by the Navy and the Marine Corps, he joined the U.S.

Army for service in the Infantry; his first station was Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He attended the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) Preparatory School; in July 1924, he began his studies at the USMA and graduated in June 1929.

From 1929 to 1930, he served with the 62d Coast Artillery Antiaircraft Regiment, at Fort Totten, New York. He served the next three years at Corregidor in the Philippine Islands. He was at Fort Monroe, Virginia from 1933-1936, then was a Japanese language student and Assistant Military Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, until 1940. For the next two years, he served at Fort Winfield Scott, with the Coast Artillery in California and

at the Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS) at Crissy Field, Presidio of San Francisco.

Colonel Rasmussen had the task of establishing a Japanese-language MISLS since the United States did not have a pool of Japanese linguists when World War II began. The school was to provide training in written and spoken Japanese language before the outbreak of World War II hostilities. Colonel Rasmussen's efforts included recruiting an instructor staff of first-generation American-born Japanese and establishing a program of instruction. This provided the basis for the eventual establishment of the Army Language School and

subsequently the Defense Language Institute at the Presidio of Monterey, California. By 1946, more than 6000 Japanese-speaking graduates had supported the war effort in the Pacific Theater.

After World War II, Colonel Rasmussen was the Military Attaché in the U.S. Embassy in Norway. He directed Reserve training for the North Dakota. From 1953 through 1955, he served as the G2 and Chief of Order of Battle, Far East Command, in Tokyo. The last years of his active service he was Chief of the Collection and Dissemination Division in the Army G2 office; he retired from the Army in September 1955.

Intelligence Must Drive Operations

(Continued from page 43)

successes. The S2's ability to visualize the enemy and project enemy COAs has been unequivocal, and clearly presented. In sum, they have not been afraid to make the hard calls, and aggressively argue their points of view with other staff members, if necessary. Additionally, once they have made their best estimates of the enemy's likely future actions, successful S2s have also been able to integrate available collection assets into an effective

collection plan, focused on their commanders' PIR.

A strong S2—willing to make the hard calls and able to orchestrate his efforts with the rest of the staff to support the commander's plan—is postured for success both at the JRTC and against an actual opponent. By reviewing the points detailed in this article, commanders and S2s can succeed by building on the lessons learned by others.

You can direct your questions reference JRTC success to Lieutenant

Colonel Kenneth Devan via:

- E-Mail: devankw@polk-emh2.army.mil.
- FAX: (337) 531-4566 or DSN 863-4566.
- Voice Mail: (337) 531-0199 or DSN 863-0199.

Based on the JRTC rotation schedule, you may not receive an immediate response, but rest assured, you will receive one. Thanks for taking the time to read this article and thanks for any thoughts you share.*

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Flynn is currently the G2, 82d Airborne Division, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He recently commanded the 313th MI Battalion, 82d Airborne Division, and prior to that he was the Senior Observer/Controller for Intelligence at JRTC. LTC Flynn has a Master of Military Arts and Science degree from the School of Advanced Military Studies and a Master of Business Administration in Telecommunications from Golden Gate University. He also holds a bachelor's degree in Management Science from the University of Rhode Island. Readers may contact LTC Flynn via E-mail at flynnm@bragg.army.mil.

- Identify the enemy's high-value targets before the meeting, and brief them as part of the S2's intelligence update.
 - Know what collection assets are available, when they will be available, and what their capabilities and limitations are.
 - Be prepared to recommend high-payoff targets based on the wargaming session.
 - Be prepared to state when and where you believe those HPTs will appear on the battlefield (the event template).
 - Recommend which collection assets should target those HPTs.
 - Go through the same thought process to determine which assets to use in conducting battle damage assessment.
 - Review what your system will be able to track and assess the HPTs.

Figure 3. Important Considerations for Targeting and Synchronization.

QUICK TIPS

Using 3D Software to Design Element Configuration

by Sergeant First Class
Randall R. Staggs


Successful design of a TOC (tactical operations center), ACE (analysis and control element), or any operational center requires visualizing how every piece of the Intelligence battlefield operating system and work area will fuse into a "well oiled machine." Laying out and drawing your configuration on paper will not allow easy modification to your plan. Efficient planning can make or break an exercise or deployment. Since technology is here for our intelligence delivery systems, use that same advantage to plan your element's configuration to the smallest detail.

One way to visualize and modify your plan is to use commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software. Our ACE uses an inexpensive, 3-dimensional (3D), architectural software package intended for home


design that permits easy manipulation of the drawings as well as 3D viewing. The system depicts the equipment drawn to scale (height, width, and length) to give the user an optimum opportunity to move systems around within the drawing.

The 3D visualization allows the user to see where the equipment may interfere with personnel traffic and ease of movement within the M934 five-ton expanding vans. Using 3D graphics software allows one to "place" new systems where the older systems were and visualize the difference in space requirements this new or improved equipment will need. It allows us to match and mate vans next to each other, door by door, and discipline to discipline.

Visualizing in 3D is difficult. Think how much better it is when you can rotate a 3D drawing, look at it from



every angle, and virtually "walk through" your configuration step by step using "camera views." Most graphics software allows for export to Microsoft® PowerPoint® and even in a Microsoft® Word document. The primary reason we chose a 3D software package for home architecture rather than a "normal" graphic software package is that the home architectural software allows for detail placement such as wall sockets, lighting, storage, and furniture. Depicted in the figures are two such drawings, a 2D line drawing and the 3D visualization of the same van setup.



Sergeant First Class Randy Staggs is the Targeting Platoon Sergeant in A Company, 302d Military Intelligence Battalion, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade working for the V CORPS G2 ACE at Campbell Barracks in Heidelberg, Germany. His previous assignments and duties have included the Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) of the Special Operations Command-Atlantic and new COTS systems procurement of the 4th Special Operations Support Command Pacific. Readers can contact him via E-mail at greenlord@aol.com.

So You're The BICC?

(Continued from page 33)

you, especially with all the other input you will receive from everyone else. I have seen people try to improve themselves to the point of destroying themselves, do not be one of them.

You know you are working for your S2 and battalion commander; **who else are you serving?** In actuality, you also serve the scout platoon leader and company commanders.

The first S2 I worked for had an extremely close relationship with the Scouts. We worked with them, discovering their strengths and weaknesses. It also allowed the Scouts to see us in action. To most of them, you are the "geeky staff officer" who works where they set up the tents and have coffee. To

build trust, they have to learn your capabilities, and that they can rely on you to do the right thing. This is **only** possible through field time with them.

The second S2 I served worked for months to ensure that the company commanders had every possible tool they needed to succeed. Each commander had several different scales of maps with various intelligence products to include obstacle overlays, firing positions, etc. It was easy to update their materials during the battles.

Conclusion

Success in being an assistant S2 (BICC) at CMTC is based on many different things. Build your technical competence through study, visits to the CALL Center, and right-

seat rides at CMTC. Develop a close relationship with your "customers"—the Scouts and commanders—to find out their needs and capabilities. If you do that, you are sure to succeed.*

First Lieutenant Mike Nienhaus is currently serving as a Battle Captain at Joint Task Force Kelly in Stuttgart, Germany. His previous duty positions include Platoon Leader of the Ground Communications Center-Technical Control and Analysis Element (GCC TCAE) and Executive Officer of Operations Company, 751st MI Battalion at Camp Humphreys, Korea, and Assistant S2 (BICC) of 2-37 Armor Battalion, 1st Armored Division in Friedberg, Germany. Lieutenant Nienhaus is a graduate of Canisius College with a Bachelor of Science degree in Management. Readers can contact the author via E-mail at Nienhausm@hotmail.com.

LETTERS

To the Editor

In your July-September 1999 issue, you carried a "Vantage Point" article by Major General John D. Thomas, Jr. In the article MG Thomas stated that "The fielding of the CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS) gives us the first automation capability to support this mission." I believe that there was automation support for counterintelligence and human intelligence well before this.

In the 1993 timeframe, the 66th MI Brigade—which had just incorporated the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army Europe (DCSINT/USAREUR) staff from Heidelberg, Germany—fielded the Theater Rapid

Response Intelligence Processor (TRRIP) system under the watchful eye of Lieutenant Colonel Randy Honeycut and a group of contractors. It began as a three-tiered system with three-person teams and portable backpacks and developed gradually into a more robust assembly of small trucks and satellite terminals. It worked well and was quite popular in the European Theater.

Paul C. Hickey
702d MI Group
Augusta, Georgia

Read Any Good Books Lately?

We welcome reviews of books related to intelligence professional development or military history. Please mail or E-mail your book reviews with your phone number, address, the title, author, publisher, price, number of pages, and the publisher's address (listed on the table of contents page). Please send them to mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil or mail them to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-CLM (McGovern), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.

PROPONENT NOTES

OCMI Website

The Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI) website contains timely information on proponent issues ranging from enlisted career management field (CMF) overviews to warrant officer current and archived newsletters. The address is <http://huachuca-dcd.army.mil/ocmi/index.html>. We will update the website often, so please use it as a "favorite" resource for the latest information on the MI Corps.

Enlisted Actions

Manning the force remains our top priority. We are making significant progress in meeting our recruiting goals using increased enlistment bonuses, the Army College Fund, and programs such as Total Army Involvement in Recruiting (TAIR), Hometown Recruiting and Assistance Program (HRAP), and the Sergeant Major of the Army Recruiting Team (SMART). Retention numbers continue to improve in most military occupational specialties (MOSs) with increased selective reenlistment bonuses, targeted selective reenlistment bonuses, and improved promotion rates. We expect these trends to continue for the foreseeable future.

The OCMI has submitted the recommended changes to **DA PAM 611-21, Military Occupational Classification and Structure**. The Standard of Grade Authorizations includes the latest CINCOS (Change in Noncommissioned Officer Structure) NCO buybacks. The revisions adjust duties and responsibilities to match more closely the critical tasks identified during the 1999 Critical Task Site Selection Boards. It renames several MOSs—

- 96H (Common Ground Station Operator)
- 97E (Human Intelligence Collector)
- 98G (Cryptologic Linguist)
- 98H (Communications Intercept/Locator)
- 98Z (Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Senior Sergeant/Chief).

It re-caps CMF (career management field) 98 at Master Sergeant 98Z. We are working closely with PERSCOM (U.S. Total Army Personnel Command) and the Army Staff to meet the CSA (Chief of Staff of the Army) guidance to fill the divisions and armored cavalry regiments to 100 percent.

Additionally, we are closely involved in the development and design of the "Initial Brigade" or "Interim Brigade Combat Team." It will form later this year at Fort Lewis, Washington.

The point of contact for these enlisted notes is Sergeant Major Paul Moore. Thank you for all your support as I head off to the 650th MI Group. SGM Antonio Moreno is the new MI Proponent Sergeant Major; readers may contact him via E-mail at ocmi@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and by telephone at (520) 533-1174 or DSN 821-1174.

Warrant Officer Actions

Grading COMPO 3 WO Positions. Work is underway on applying objective grading to Warrant Officer (WO) positions in U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) units. This process includes—

- Identification of the duties and responsibilities for each WO position.
- Meeting the incremental percentages for each grade.

- Applying the grading methodology to the positions documented to TOE (table of organization and equipment) and TDA (table of distribution and allowances) elements in COMPO 3.

The process's target completion is the second quarter fiscal year 2000 (2QFY00). The point of contact for this note is Sergeant First Class (SFC) Robert Davies; you can contact him at (520) 533-9346 or DSN 821-9346 and by E-mail at robert.davies@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

351B and 351E Call to Active Duty. The U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) has issued a call to active duty for MI Warrant Officers who hold military occupational specialties (MOSs) 351B (Counterintelligence Technician) or 351E (Human Intelligence Collection Technician). We are specifically looking for Korean-speaking 351Es. This call will be open for one year.

To apply, Reserve Component (RC) Warrant Officers must meet all of the requirements necessary for appointment to active duty. Additionally, 351E Warrants must possess a current SECRET clearance and 351Bs must have a current TOP SECRET with eligibility for sensitive compartmented information (SCI) not more than five years old. To apply, submit a **DA Form 4187, Personnel Action**, with supporting documentation to PERSCOM.

The point of contact for this note and all Warrant Officer actions is Chief Warrant Officer Five Rex Williams, Chief Warrant Officer of the MI Corps. Readers can contact CW5 Williams via E-mail at

williamsx@huachuca-emh1.army.mil or by telephone at (520) 533-1183 or DSN 821-1183.

Officer and Civilian Personnel Actions

Three officer year-groups have undergone the career field (CF) designation process to Functional Area (FA) 34, Strategic Intelligence Officer. Many of these officers had already received training and now fill FA 34 positions. Currently, some designated officers are attending the Postgraduate Intelligence Program (PGIP). The first iteration of the Strategic Intelligence Officer Course (SIOC) for FA 34 officers was held at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and the first class graduated in June 1999. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) will conduct this course annually before the start of PGIP.

The point of contact for this information is Ms. Charlotte Borghardt. Direct any questions on officer or civilian personnel matters to Ms. Charlotte Borghardt or Captain Gregory Meyer at (520) 533-1188 or DSN 821-1188. Their E-mail addresses are borghardt@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and

meyerg@huachuca-emh1.army.mil, respectively.

MI Force Actions

USAR Force Design. In coordination with the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), the OCMI redesigned the 321st and 325th MI Battalions in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). We completed the Corps Support Battalion (CSB) redesign with changes applied to the analysis and control and counterintelligence companies. For more information, readers may contact Mr. John Quinn via E-mail at quinnj@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and by telephone at (520) 538-0871 and DSN 879-0871.

Work between the Department of Army (DA) Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, USAIC&FH, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center Security Command (INSCOM), and USARC has begun on the redesign of the theater RC support battalions. Using the methodology of the CSB work effort, this project focuses on streamlining various elements within each of the three battalions. The desired end-state is to enhance the units' abilities to recruit, train, interoperate, and retain. The target date for completion is

4QFY00. The point of contact for this note is SFC Davies.

Force Documentation. In early September, OCMI started work with INSCOM on a force design update (FDU) for the 204th Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Reconnaissance). Currently, the mission of the 204th MI Battalion (AR) is to provide signals and imagery intelligence products to supported commanders in chief and war-fighting commanders. The purpose of the redesign is to allow direct command and control (C²) of all assets. Currently, the four AR teams that process, exploit, and disseminate signals and imagery intelligence are with the 297th MI Battalion (Operations) but this relationship is not efficient. Our recommendation is to move the four teams into the 204th Military Intelligence Battalion (AR) and to restructure within the battalion, creating a new aerial reconnaissance operations company. We anticipate having the 204th MI Battalion FDU packet ready for submission for the January 2000-1 Force Design Update. Contact Master Sergeant Timothy Carroll at (520) 533-1185 or DSN 821-1185 for more information.

SLY FOX

**by Master Sergeant
Kristine M. Sleighter**

The Military Intelligence Corps faces an exciting and busy new year as we move into the next millennium. With no decline in the force's operating tempo (OPTEMPO) in sight, we must, as leaders, periodically review and assess the competency and proficien-

It can be difficult to ascertain which of our operators are "basic" qualified with any of the three ASAS systems (all-source, single-source and remote workstation) and who is capable of advanced functions such as enclave implementation, focus, and orchestration. To align our human talent to the appropriate system effectively, we must know the levels of our operators' qualifications. Do you know who in

your unit meets the basic qualifications on ASAS and who holds master certification? An enlisted soldier in military occupational specialty (MOS) 96B (Intelligence Analyst) who is an ASAS Master Analyst will hold additional skill identifier (ASI) 1F. In the case of warrant officers and those with other MI MOSs, the master analyst will be a graduate of the ASAS Master Analyst Course (AMAC).

Block I - Course Introduction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Role of the ASAS Master Analyst AST Information Engineering Training Management Standing Operating Procedures Information Security
Block II -	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal II (TROJAN SPIRIT II or TS II) Communications Control Set (CCS)
Block III -	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Single Source Remote Workstation All Source
Block IV -	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> "Sly Fox" Crew Phase Exercise

Figure 1. Organization of the ASAS Master Analyst Course.

The ASAS Master Analyst Branch (AMAB) by design will assist units in the field in broadening their knowledge base regarding ASAS. The AMAB course schedule will expand in fiscal year 2000 from two to three classes per year. For the AMAB to be successful in supportcourse. Those unable to obtain the 60-percent score return to their organizations for additional training at the basic-user level; their units can renominate them later.

The AMAC consists of eight weeks of intense ASAS training as well as refinement of the student's analytical skills. The course comprises four blocks of instruction (see

Figure 1). Additionally, the students must prepare and brief their units' communications and information ASAS architectures, an analytical paper based on a historic battle, and also prepare or revise an ASAS standing operating procedure tailored to their units.

ASAS is the MI "crew-served weapon." For commanders to successfully implement and execute their missions using ASAS, their soldiers must have the maximum amount of quality training possible. Without it, the unit may execute the mission but to what standard? The ASAS Master Analyst can advise the command on ASAS training issues such as the implementation of

a training sustainment plan to keep ASAS knowledge resident in the organization and cultivating young soltors, as well as performing a myriad of other ASAS-related tasks. We should afford the next generation of master analysts the opportunity as well. For every seat in the AMAC that goes unfilled, we potentially deny our Corps a fully trained ASAS professional. The long-term dividends to the force are greater if we maximize every opportunity available to train our soldiers to become the best tactical and technical soldiers they can be. This is in support of keeping MI, "Always Out Front!"

Master Sergeant Kristine Sleighter is the Chief, ASAS Master Analyst Branch, Directorate of Continuous Learning at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. She has previously served as Chief, Intelligence Section, U.S. Army Europe Battlefield Coordination Element at Ramstein Airbase, Germany. She is a graduate of the ASAS Master Analyst Course and the Theater-Level Collection Manager and Intelligence Analyst Courses. She is in her third year studying for a Bachelor of Science degree in a Business and Information Systems Program. Readers can contact her via E-mail at sleighterk@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and by telephone at (520) 533-4652 or DSN 821-4652.

1st USAR Linguist Unit (RTU)

The 1st USAR (U.S. Army Reserve) Linguist Unit (RTU) is a points-only linguist unit located in Alexandria, Virginia, but with a world-wide membership. Our mission is to provide linguist support to Active and Reserve Component forces globally and to maintain perishable language skills by training qualified linguists in the Army Reserve. Membership is open to all Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Army Reservists regardless of rank, branch, foreign language background, and location.

The three major requirements are:

- A certified language ability (minimum Defense Language Proficiency Test or DLPT 2/2).
- A strong desire to maintain and increase language proficiency.
- The motivation to actively contribute to the unit through projects and staff responsibilities.

We are extremely flexible with training. This unit provides a great opportunity to use your foreign language skills, earn an officer or noncommissioned officer evaluation report (OER, NCOER), and gain access to paid, real-world language training opportunities with agencies world wide.

Interested candidates should contact Lieutenant Colonel Canning Kraft, Unit Recruiting Officer, at E-mail CKrafts@aol.com or write to Commander, 1st USAR Linguist Unit, ATTN: Recruiting Officer, Lieber USAR Center, 6901 Telegraph Road, Alexandria, VA 22310.

TSM NOTES

Update on SEMA and UAV Operations and Programs

by Colonel William M. Knarr, Jr.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager (TSM) for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Aerial Common Sensor (UAV/ACS) office continues its efforts to extend the "eyes" and "ears" of the commander and to simplify the collection and dissemination of intelligence. The following article provides an update of those efforts in both the Special Electronic Mission Aircraft (SEMA) and UAV worlds.

SEMA Initiatives

In my last column, I gave you an overview of the substantial changes that have taken place in the SEMA manned airborne reconnaissance field over the past several years. As we prepare for the dawn of the new millennium, the SEMA fleet continues to provide daily intelligence collection in support of our national interests in a variety of locations around the globe.

During the past year, the 3d Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation) (AE) provided daily support to operations in Korea with the Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS) and Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) systems. Fielded more than 11 years ago, GRCS System 3 is the oldest GRCS system in the Army inventory. Although the System 3 aircraft have rotated through a CONUS (continental United States) depot maintenance facility, the System 3 Integrated Processing Facility (IPF) has not received the same treatment and will soon require replacement.

In October 1999, the unit took delivery of the Phase 2 Guardrail Re-

lay Facility (GRF). The GRF is a U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) initiative to leverage technology and funding from multiple sources for constructing a shelter-based replacement for the System 3 IPF. The GRF also includes a capability to relay mission data to remote locations for additional processing. Because it does not yet have all the capability available in the IPF, the GRF will serve as an adjunct to the existing IPF for the next year. With completion of the GRF Phase 3 initiative early in fiscal year 2001 (FY01), full capability will be available and the existing IPFs will retire. The shelter-based GRF configuration will also serve as a testbed for future HMMWV- (high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle) based ground stations known as mini-IPFs.

In December 1995, the 1st MI Battalion (AE) deployed GRCS System 4 from Wiesbaden, Germany, to Taszar, Hungary, in support of initial operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The unit has been conducting split-based operations ever since, with almost half of the battalion forward-deployed at any given time. Early in 1999, the unit completed contingency plans to provide increased collection capability in the southern Balkans. As tensions in Kosovo continued to rise, the unit sent an advanced party to Italy to determine the suitability of the forward base and to test their collection capability in the new area of operations. After determining that the new location was suitable, the unit ceased operations in Taszar and moved the entire

GRCS system to Italy. Although developed to provide dedicated support to ground forces, the unique high accuracy and responsiveness provided by the GRCS were deemed critical to support the air campaign in Kosovo.

The 224th MI Battalion (AE) has also begun the transition away from the "mobile field station" architecture toward one that is HMMWV-based and more mobile and scaleable. The first step was fielding a shelter with the capability to interoperate with selected joint Service airborne signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems in September 1999. At the same time, the unit also took delivery of new computer systems that will replace the old, legacy mainframe computers in the IPF. The next step is to field a HMMWV-based shelter to replace the existing communications and reporting equipment in mid-FY00.

The 15th MI Battalion (AE) supported real-world operations in Kosovo with the Hunter UAV (discussed below) and is in the midst of its train-up for the spring fielding of GRCS System 2. This system will replace the 15th's current Improved Guardrail V system, and will provide precision SIGINT targeting capability to III Corps for the first time. System 2 will also provide the unit with a radically new force-projection capability through integration of the Direct Aircraft-to-Satellite Relay (DASR) capability that will eliminate the requirement for any type of ground processing facility in the forward area.

The 204th MI Battalion (AE) has been busy conducting operations in support of the Commander in

Chief, U.S. Southern Command (CINCSOUTHCOM). Tragically, an ARL-I (Airborne Reconnaissance Low-IMINT) aircraft and all five U.S. crewmembers were lost in an accident in Columbia this July. Although the crewmembers can never be replaced, the fielding of ARL-M4 (ARL-Multifunction) aircraft in September partially offset the loss of the airframe. This aircraft contains upgraded electro-optic and infrared (EO/IR) imaging systems and a combination synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) with a moving target indicator (MTI). New equipment training on this latest aircraft culminated in a Limited User Test in the December 1999-January 2000 time frame.

UAV Operations and Initiatives

In the continuing effort to acquire a maneuver brigade commander's tactical UAV (TUAV), we are implementing a two-phased competitive approach to select a capable UAV system. Dr. Jacques Gansler, Department of Defense Acquisition Chief, approved this approach in the 12 March 1999 acquisition decision memorandum. Four candidate systems demonstrated their capabilities at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, from October through November 1999. The Army will choose the winner in December with the Low-Rate Initial Production award scheduled to occur in December or January.

The 21st MI Company (Aerial Surveillance) (MICAS) continues its UAV support to Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations. The unit has supported training for the 29th Separate Infantry Brigade, Hawaii Army National Guard; 1st and 2d Brigades, 82d Airborne Division; and 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). The Hunter UAVs conducted a nine-hour mission support of the III Corps Bosnia-bound Mission Re-

hearsal Exercise training. This mission more closely replicates the Predator UAV type of support provided during the III Corps-to-Bosnia deployment than the brigade commander's TUAV scenario normally conducted by the 21st MICAS in support of JRTC training.

A Hunter UAV system, operated by A Company, 15th MI Battalion (AE), deployed in March 1999 in support of Operation ALLIED FORCE. The 15th then continued its support through the three phases of the operation—Task Force (TF) Noble Anvil, TF Hawk, and TF Falcon—and the differing missions associated with each phase.

- **TF Noble Anvil (4-26 April 1999).** The primary UAV missions in support of TF Noble Anvil consisted of targeting and battle damage assessment for the air campaign.
- **TF Hawk (27 April-2 June 1999).** Mission support to TF Hawk consisted of support to the assigned Apache unit with target development, reconnaissance of Apache routes and engagement areas, and mission rehearsals.
- **TF Falcon (3 June-1 November 1999).** The mission associated with TF Falcon consisted of verification of the Military Technical Agreement; route reconnaissance in support of the British, U.S. Army, and U.S. Marines' movements; force protection for initial entry forces; and support to the Kosovo Forces.

On 12 October 1999, the U.S. Army and the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence launched a joint initiative to explore the use of TUAVs on future battlefields. The agreement was signed at the Association of the United States Army Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C., by the representatives of the

two countries. Lieutenant General Paul Kern (Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) represented the United States and Major General David Jenkins (Master General of the Ordnance and an Executive Director of the Defence Procurement Agency) represented the United Kingdom. The *Letter of Intent* opens the way to explore future opportunities in achieving higher levels of interoperability between the nations' TUAV systems to support our respective land forces.

Annual UAV Conference

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) and the TSM UAV/ACS hosted the annual UAV Conference at Fort Huachuca 21 through 23 September 1999. The theme for this year's conference was "UAVs: Supporting Real World Requirements." Highlighting this year's agenda were presentations on UAV support to recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Kosovo.

The more operational flavor of the conference presentations included briefings from the U.S. Army's 15th MI Battalion (AE) on their Hunter UAV support to the NATO air campaign, TFs Hawk and Falcon, and a U.S. Air Force (USAF) presentation on the Predator's role during the conflict. Equally interesting were the briefings on Allied UAV participation. Officers from the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence presented information on their "Phoenix" UAV system's role in the campaign, while two of Fort Huachuca's Foreign Liaison Officers (LNOs) discussed the contributions made by their countries' UAV systems. Lieutenant Colonels Bertrand Chandouineau and Kurt Schwarz each provided excellent briefings on their respective country's UAV efforts (the CL-289

and Crecerelle from France and the CL-289 from Germany) during the NATO campaign.

Major Yossi Tebul, Israeli LNO to USAIC&FH, provided a truly informative and interesting presentation on his country's employment of UAV systems to support their ongoing efforts to maintain northern Israel's security. Herr Walter Spies from the German Ministry of Defense, Procurement, and Acquisitions Office, gave a presentation on their current UAV development and acquisition efforts. Representatives of the Armor, Aviation, and Field Artillery Schools and Centers, and the Maneuver Support Center each provided other important presentations on their respective concepts for UAV support to their combat forces.

Additionally, conference attendees received a wide range of other UAV-related presentations, including—

- USAF weather support to UAV operations.



- Improvements and developments in sensor technology.
- On-going experiments conducted by the U.S. Air Force UAV Battle Lab.
- An update on lessons learned from the first three UAV-supported training rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and Fort Polk.

The Conference presentations also included briefings from the Department of the Army, the U.S. Navy, the USAF, U.S. Atlantic Command (now Joint Forces Command), the Communications and Electronics Command, the Project Manager's (PM) Office for Tactical UAVs, the

PM's Office for the Tactical Control System, the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and Picatinny Arsenal. Those briefings are available through our web site (<http://huachuca-dcd-army.mil/TSMUAV/TSM-UAV.htm>). Post-conference comments have been very favorable and it appears that everyone gained some important information in their particular areas of interest with respect to UAV programs.

My thanks to Alice Hawker, Lee Ilse, and Ted Girouard for their input to this column.

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ASAS in the Medium-Weight Brigade

by Colonel Jerry V. Proctor

As this issue of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* nears publication, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) has announced that the Army will stand up a new brigade structure at Fort Lewis, Washington. This new structure is far from firm; however, the scope and role played by the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) is significant.

This medium-weight Brigade's design will handle the entire spectrum of engagement with much more emphasis on stability and support types of operations. Consequently, this new Brigade will have a very heavy contingent of ASAS counterintelligence and hu-

man intelligence (CI/HUMINT) automation tools including—

- Handheld agents' device called the Individual Tactical Reporting Tool (ITRT).
- CI/HUMINT Automation Tool Set (CHATS).
- Developmental battalion-level CI analysis workstation.

Additionally, the number of ASAS remote workstation (RWS) systems will be more than double that of a normal brigade.

The crucial point here is that the new ASAS is on the **Army's leading edge**. If you have not heard the update on where the new ASAS suite of systems (a total of ten separate subsystems) is going, please

send me a note and I will brief all MI professionals in your command. In fact, I gave such a brief in December at the request of the V Corps G2.

ASAS is far more relevant and ready for operations across the full spectrum in the coming years. Let me show you how.

Colonel Jerry Proctor is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager (TSM) for ASAS. Readers can contact him via E-mail at proctorj1@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 533-3504 or DSN 821-3504. The Deputy TSM is Mr. Michael Strack. Readers can reach him by E-mail at strackm@huachuca-emh1.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 533-3507 or DSN 821-3507.

How to Submit an Article to *MIPB*

Select a relevant topic of interest to the military intelligence community. For example, it could be about current operations and exercises, equipment, TTP, or training. It could be historical, explain lessons learned, or it could be an essay-type thought-provoking piece. It could be a short "quick tip" on better use of equipment or personnel, or fast "work-arounds" for problems. Articles from the "hot spots" are always welcome. Seek to add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps. Propose changes, describe a new theory to dispute an existing theory, explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or explain how a new piece of new technology will change the way we operate.

Write an outline to organize your work and include a working title and headings. Plan to write 1000-2500 words (about 2-4 pages single-spaced text with normal margins, not counting graphics) and include graphics that enhance understanding of your topic. Quick tips should be 300-800 words. Put the "bottom line up front" and write clear, concise introduction and conclusion paragraphs. Follow proper rules of grammar. Consult **DA Pamphlet 600-67, Effective Writing for Army Leaders** or William A. McIntosh's **Guide to Effective Writing**.

Stylistically, avoid several pitfalls when writing for *MIPB* in order to write a clearer, more forceful article:

- **Maintain the active voice as much as possible.** Write, "The soldier performed the task" rather than "The task was performed by the soldier."
- **Make your point.** Avoid writing about internal organization administration. If your topic is a new piece of technology, tell the readers why it is important, how it works better, and how it will affect them. Avoid lengthy descriptions of who approved the new system, quotations from senior leaders describing how good the system is, the reports your organization filed regarding the system, etc.
- **Use the fewest words to state your points.** Write "Leaders must emphasize training" rather than "It is imperative for Military Intelligence professional leaders to refocus their attention to training issues."

Please send the article via E-mail to vesselase@huachuca-emh1.army.mil with a courtesy copy to mcgovern@huachuca-emh1.army.mil or mail it (with a soft copy on disk) to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-CLM (MIPB), [FedEx/Priority Mail: Bldg 61730, Room 102], Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. (Please do not use special document templates and attach the graphics separately). We can accept articles in Microsoft Office 97, Word 6.0, Word Perfect 6.0a, and ASCII and PowerPoint or Corel graphics.) Please include with your article:

- A cover letter with your work, home, and E-mail addresses and telephone numbers, stating your wish to have the article published. Please include your social security number (SSN) so that we can find you if you transfer, PCS, or ETS/retire before we publish your article; we will protect your SSN and make no other use of it. Also, indicate whether we may put your article on our Internet web site even if we do not publish it in the printed magazine.
- Pictures, graphics, and crests/logos with adequate descriptions. Try to find good "action" photos that illustrate your article; photos and other graphics really enliven an article. We need complete captions for the photos (the who, what, where, when, why, and how; the photographer credits; and include the author's name on photos). We can return photos if so requested—be sure to include an address to which you want the photos sent after we use them. We will gladly accept photos without articles too.
- A release signed by your local security officer or SSO stating that your article is unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain. (*MIPB* is available for sale by the Government Printing Office and posted on the Internet.)
- The full name of each author in the byline and a biography for each. The biography should include the authors' current duty position, other related assignments, civilian degrees (degree, school, major), and advanced military education (CGSC, War College, SAMS, MSSi, SEIP, PGIP, etc.). (Tell us if we can print your telephone number and E-mail address with the biography.)

We cannot guarantee that we will publish all submitted articles. We will send you an acknowledgment that we received your article. We may notify you again when we get ready to run it. Please inform us of your current E-mail, telephone numbers, and postal addresses if you change jobs, move, or PCS. It can take a year or more before we run some articles.

202d Military Intelligence Battalion

The 202d MI Battalion's Coat of Arms features Oriental blue and silver, colors traditionally associated with Military Intelligence. The helmet is adapted from the device of the 513th MI Brigade, reflecting the unit's original assignment; rendered on a checkered background, the helmet symbolizes counter-intelligence (CI) activities. The lightning flash denotes speed and electronic warfare, the torch symbolizes truth and alludes to interrogation, and the dragon—a mythical guardian of treasure—signifies security and strength. Thus, the design elements of the device represent the unit's mission and capabilities.

Activated at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, on 2 October 1982, the Battalion is a subordinate element of the 513th MI Brigade. Units incorporated into the 202d have a long, distinguished history of service to the nation, including participation in the Pacific Theater in World War II, the Korean Conflict, Vietnam, and Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM/THUNDER/FOX and RESTORE HOPE.

The 202d MI Battalion moved to Fort Gordon, Georgia, in 1994 and evolved into an element capable of rapid deployment into hostile environments to provide sustained CI and human intelligence (HUMINT) support. Some elements of the 202d perform the Battalion's mission at locations away from Fort Gordon. Civilians assigned to Field Offices in Atlanta, Georgia, and Tampa, Florida, perform HUMINT collection. Soldiers and civilians stationed in Puerto Rico comprise D Company (Forward), providing intelligence support to the Commanding General (CG), U. S. Army South. From a permanent CI Field Office established in November 1998 at Camp Doha, Kuwait, and a subordinate Resident Office in Doha, Qatar, 202d personnel perform CI and HUMINT activities in general support of CG, U. S. Army Forces Central Command.

While the battalion's primary focus is support to the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of Central Command (CENTCOM) and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), it has operational commitments in Europe and on-order force projection responsibilities elsewhere as well. Over the past year, the 202d deployed soldiers and civilians to many countries around the world to perform its mission and advance the spirit of democracy. Among other countries, 202d personnel deployed to Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bosnia, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Georgia, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkmenistan. During operational deployments, Battalion members worked to help—

- Enforce sanctions to ensure stability in the volatile region of Southwest Asia.
- Restore order to the war-torn countries of Haiti and Bosnia.
- Rebuild the hurricane-ravaged Central American countries of Honduras and El Salvador.
- Fend off the encroachment of Colombian drug producers/transporters into the United States.

The Battalion has established close operational, exercise, and training relationships with Reserve Component (RC) units across the United States, including units in Florida, New York, and Utah. In June 1999, the Battalion hosted Southern Knight, a joint exercise that combined interrogation, document exploitation, and RC integration. More than 200 affiliated RC personnel participated in the largest exercise of its kind in the U.S. Armed Forces during fiscal year 1999.

The 202d MI Battalion's participation in various operations reinforces the validity of its motto, "Collect and Exploit", providing timely, quality CI and HUMINT support to the combat forces. The Battalion today is the culmination of outstanding leaders, years of experience, and the dedication and efforts of thousands of soldiers.

Deuce—Second to None!



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